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Anchoring, Imaginative Variation, and Existential Phenomenology (see more)

Anchoring, Imaginative Variation, and Existential Phenomenology: On the problem of naturalizing content in the philosophy of psychology

Frank Scalambrino, Ph.D. University of Dallas
What we may call the primary question-problem complex today in the philosophy of psychology and cognitive science involves the interpretation of data regarding various human brain states. At the forefront of this question-problem complex is a tension between first-person and third-person perspectives. Beyond material naturalistic and normative behavioristic approaches which may seek to eliminate first-person perspectives, my thesis seeks to interpret the data, while at the same time affirming the first-person perspective. My thesis differs from other approaches which affirm the first-person perspective in a number of ways. Most noticeably, I suggest a shift from a Cartesian/Husserlian-based vocabulary which heavily relies on the term “consciousness” to an “existential”/Heidegger-based vocabulary, invoking terms such as “being-in-the-world.” In this way, I argue for an interpretation of the data in terms of a being’s mnemonic-grasp (cf. Scalambrino, 2012) of its environment by critically discussing eliminative interpretations of the data and the psychological activities of “anchoring” and “imaginative variation.” My non-eliminative position differs from similar positions in the emphasis I place on memory and the manner in which I link memory and fundamental ontology. Simply put, I argue memory goes “all the way down,” and I articulate being-in-the-world as a transcendental unity which mnemonically encompasses empirical aspects indicated by brain states.

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  • Sally R.

    I'm sorry I missed this! My job interfered with my life.

    April 9, 2014

  • Glenn

    Great topic but too academic for most attendees.

    April 9, 2014

  • Skip K.

    Fast paced, complex lecture. Gave my cortex a workout.

    April 9, 2014

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