"Reification" is a term that is used in many disciplines, ranging from psychology and sociology to economics, linguistics, and computer science. Generally it means treating an abstraction as having concrete existence. Examples are "nation", "race", and "democracy". Sometimes the analysis is merely descriptive (as in "Nation is a politically organized body of people under a single government."), sometimes it is disapproving ("Race is an artificial biological construct used to stigmatize certain groups.").

In Philosophy the term describes a logical fallacy. The following text is taken from about.com. As usual, feel free to critique the critique.

"Explanation:
This [fallacy] is very similar to the Equivocation Fallacy, except that instead of using one word and changing its meaning through the argument, it takes a word with a normal usage and gives it an invalid usage. Specifically, it involves ascribing substance or real existence to mental constructs or concepts. When human-like qualities are attributed as well, we also have anthropomorphization.

Examples and Discussion:
Here are some ways in which the fallacy of Reification can occur in various arguments:

1. The government has a hand in everybody's business and another in every person's pocket. By limiting such governmental pickpocketing, we can limit its incursions on our freedom.

2. I can't believe that the universe would allow humans and human achievement just to fade away, therefore there must be a God and an afterlife where all will be preserved.

In both of these arguments, we can see use of reification in two different ways. In the first, the concept of "government" is assumed to have attributes like desire which more properly belong to volitional creatures, like people. There is an unstated premise that it is wrong for a person to put their hands in your pocket and it is concluded that it is also immoral for the government to do the same.

What is ignored is the fact that "government" is simply a collection of people, not a person itself - it has no hands, therefore it cannot pickpocket. If the government's taxing of the people is wrong, it must be wrong for reasons other than a too-literal association with pickpocketing.

In the second example above, the attributes being used are more human, thus indicating that this example of reification is also anthropomorphization. There is no reason to think that the "universe," as such, really cares about anything - us included. If it is not capable of caring, then the fact that it does not care is not a good reason to believe that it will miss us after we are gone. Thus, it is invalid to construct a logical argument which relies upon the assumption that the universe does care.

Sometimes atheists create an argument using this fallacy which is similar to example #1, but which involves religion:

3. Religion attempts to destroy our liberty and is therefore immoral.

Once again, religion has no volition - it is not a person. No human-created belief system can "try" to either destroy or build anything. Various religious doctrines are certainly problematic, and it is true that many religious people attempt to undermine liberty, but it is muddled thinking to confuse the two.

Of course, it should be noted that hypostatization is really just the use of metaphor - but, as a fallacy, it is metaphor which has been taken too far. It can be very useful to employ metaphors and abstractions in what we write, but they carry a danger in that we can begin to believe, without realizing it, that our abstract entities have the concrete attributes we metaphorically ascribe to them.

How we describe a thing has a great influence on what we believe about it, which means that our impression of reality is often structured by the language we use to describe reality. Thus, this fallacy teaches us to be careful in how we describe things, lest we begin to imagine that our description has an objective essence beyond the language itself."

Serious Linguistic Sword Play!

I think the point that you make at the end of the exercise is essentially a strong one. I have been reading Nietzsche who alludes to this and what you have stated goes back to the question I raised which you answered very clearly.

Much of the spoken and written word in the western tradition is based on abstract ideas. This is seen in philosophy, and literature (poetry and prose). And often rigorous arguments are made where abstract concepts are personified in the arguments. An example of this is the western idea of the 'state'. The works of ancient Roman (Cicero, Caesar, etc.) give the Roman state an essence that is almost an concrete as a real human being.

I personally do not see this fallacy on the same par as those previously stated.

From my perspective, I agree or disagree with the first statement based on my opinion of the truth of the statement. Giving abstract concepts concrete action is not necessarily bad logic. Sometimes it is quite appropriate since in many ways the government figuratively does pick your pocket. We give abstract concepts life and this 'logical fallacy' is not something that is clearly a fallacy. These concepts do exist and they do have power but we must careful. There are certain verbs we can associate with them and there are certain verbs we can associate with them. If another verb is associated with the government that is clearly something that it cannot do such as 'swim', or 'run' then it would be clear that there is a big error. This is because logically the government cannot swim or run.

With the third statement (made a mistake here previously and correcting it), the structure of the statement is not invalid from my perspective. I think that with statements of this type, we look at whether we feel the statement is true and then decide whether to argue for fallacy or not. How a person sees the structure of the statement depends on whether the individual agrees with the particular statement or not.

For example, with the word religion one can point to the lack of truth of the statement and then find the reason why the statement is wrong (fallacious reasoning) which is what you have delineated above. This is because religion has a neutral feeling to many of us. It does not feel completely bad or completely good to a lot of us (David Hume bless you!) and so that allows us to see the statement in a certain way (in this case fallacious).

If I substitute the word 'racism', then the statement does not seem so fallacious. A different concept has been put in which is more 'negative'. Racism does not have a positive side and is hardly ever seen as good. Therefore there is no apparent fallacy.

Your point is 100% correct. Often we do not argue objectively simply because of the choice of words that we use. Personification and the use of metaphor can be very bad as far as obfuscating meaning. But they do have power with respect to certain verbs associated with them.

I consider myself an Idealist, such that everything, abstract or otherwise, is nothing more than an idea in my mind. Thus, for me any reference to a "real" object "out there" is reification. However, I do engage in conversations with, what I interpret to be, other humans like me (may some deity help you if you are exactly like me) in which I am perfectly willing to use words/concepts/memes in what passes for "normal discourse". I understand that position is now referred to as "moral fictionalism". I don't believe there's a tree over there, but I'm willing to say there is for the sake of the conversation. If you wish to assert there is, in fact, a tree over there, I am not likely to raise the reification card. However, there are certain memes and/or situations that will bring out the reification card, eg. nation, freedom, right, good, etc. The point is, for me, philosophically, all references to "real" objects is reification, but pragmatically, I only play the card in certain situations. The Realist, on the other hand, is philosophically disposed to accept that there are "real" objects out there and that there are occasional misidentifications of that reality. We could both play the reification card in a given situation, but would be doing so from different perspectives: I would be pointing to what I consider a "truth", you would be pointing to what you consider an "untruth". Objectively, we would both be saying there is something amiss here, but, subjectively, we say that for different reasons. And this was Schopenhauer's point that knowledge is both a subjective and objective process and we, too often, only take one side of the process.

Nick:
I think you are correct that in many cases these kinds of statements aren’t logical fallacies but inappropriate metaphors. However, what interests me is how we decide which metaphors work and which do not. You approve of “the government picks our pockets” because you think it is something that a person can do (and a government by definition is comprised of people), but you would reject “the government swims with lobbyist sharks”. Your justification is that it is conceivable for a government to pick pockets but not to swim. But no abstraction can act like a human being, so what makes one acceptable and the other not? Is it that the first metaphor is commonly used, giving it currency, but the second is not? What should we conclude about these two reification “fallacies”: (1) “Justice is blind” and (2) “Because Nature’s law is nothing more than survival of the fittest, we should use science to blunt its cruelty.”? Both are personifications, but the first is an assertion while the second is closer to a logical argument. I wonder if we should reverse the cause and effect relationship I first proposed: rather than say these statements have been popular because they have been frequently repeated, it is more credible that they became popular because they were immediately recognized as felicitous metaphors. But if I say this I then am returned to my earlier stumbling block–what makes a metaphor, used to personify a reification, felicitous?

Regarding the article’s second example–“I can't believe that the universe would allow humans and human achievement just to fade away, therefore there must be a God and an afterlife where all will be preserved”–, I agree that one can reject the underlying premise (that God exists) but still think the metaphor appropriate. For the religious, the universe is a surrogate for God and human behaviors are often attributed to him.

John:
You, like Schophenhauer, seem to find Berkeley’s Idealism seductive but, like Berkeley, play the pragmatism card–I will pretend objects really exist outside of my mind because I don’t want to be run over by cars or be arrested by the IRS for non-payment of taxes. When you say that all concrete objects are fundamentally abstractions and hence reifications, does it follow that all abstractions are reifications or can become reifications once they have been personified? For example, “Nation” and “Wealth” are reifications, but what about “Wisdom”? I have never heard it personified, but I can do that now with this sentence: “Wisdom comes late in life.” "Division" also seems knotty, but here's a sentence: "Division is useful in mathematics but not in relationships." I guess I have answered my own question.

I was reading for something else that involved a discussion of the term "nominalism", which reminded me of this fallacy. The following is a comment based upon the entry on "Nominalism in Metaphysics" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP).

Scott's original definition of reification was, "Generally, it means treating an abstraction as having concrete existence." He then gives nation, race and democracy as examples. The SEP says that a universal is "something that can be instantiated by different entities" and an abstraction is "something that is neither spatial nor temporal". If we accept this distinction between the two notions, then the examples "nation" and "race" would not count as reifications since both can be instantiated. They would be considered universals, not abstractions. Yet, SEP also states that nominalism in "its most traditional sense derives from the Middle Ages and implies the rejection of universals. In another, more modern but equally entrenched sense, it implies the rejection of abstract objects". This points to some ambiguity for the notion of nominalism, but our concern here is that of reification, in which case it raises the question of what is to count as being an "abstraction". If we accept the SEP definitions, do we then need to modify the definition of reification to include universals or just reconsider our examples? However, if one thinks that universal and abstraction are synonymous, then the issue is moot. The SEP entry says they are not, but also suggests there is not unanimity on the matter.

What you have stated in interesting and points to what I was trying to express. When we refer to certain concepts using verbs that refer to human beings, sometimes verbs are appropriate. Sometimes not. And I think it depends on whether the concept used in the sentence is a universal or abstraction.

Very good point! Cuts to the heart of things! :D