(We'll meet at the Imperial Pub again as I couldn't book World's Biggest Bookstore. Next week (27th Feb, Thursday), we'll go there).
This week, lets do topics on both instrumental and epistemic rationality.
"Tell culture" seems like a simple and useful article for instrumental rationality. http://lesswrong.com/lw/jis/tell_culture/.
Let's return to "Free Will" for the epistemic part: http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/Free_will.
We've discussed Free Will in the past, but I don't consider it settled completely until I am able to dissolve the problem for another person, which usually involves reducing free will to an illusion. This time, however, I'm dealing with the opposite issue - if someone is convinced that there is no free will, and I think most of us are, but cannot identify with the illusion of free will (read LW posts), how can we explain our illusory feeling to that person?
For added fun, consider which parts of a super powerful AI-like computer come closest to computing a free will-like illusion.
Another good article with a computational complexity/quantum theory flavour to free will in a lecture by Scott Aaronson at U of Waterloo: http://www.scottaaronson.com/democritus/lec18.html