Aristotelian theory of virtue and of happiness assumes a moral psychology in which parts of the soul, rational and non-rational can communicate well with each other. But if Aristotle cannot give a robust account of what communicating well consists in he faces the charge that his moral psychology collapses into a moralizing psychology, assuming the very categories it seeks to vindicate. This paper by Jonathan Lear examines the problem and proposes a way forward: namely, that psychoanalysis provides the resources for characterizing a satisfying Aristotelian moral psychology.
-taken from Lear's paper, 21 pages (link below)
Optional: consider reading the last paragraphs of Aristotle's Ethics, book one, section 13
AUDIO PRESENTATION OF THE PAPER: http://backdoorbroadcasting.net/2013/11/jonathan-lear-integrating-the-non-rational-soul/