There are various ways of forming responses to questions about what a person is.
Perhaps the most common is to understand a person as a kind of object - a thing or community of things. This approach is compatible with naturalistic (persons as animals, or as emergent from material) and less-naturalistic (persons as immaterial souls or streams of consciousness) conclusions.
As many philosophers have pointed out, however, modeling persons on objects can run into a conceptual brick wall - that persons are primarily subjects. What could this possibly mean, if a subject is not to be just one more object? It seems very difficult to regard myself strictly from my own first-person standpoint, without accepting alongside it the existence of second- and third-person standpoints on me.
In addition to wandering within and among these familiar avenues, we will take some time tonight on a third proposal: that persons are best understood neither as objects nor as subjects, but rather as foci of activity. To persons belongs a special way of being active - the way that involves pursuit of goals, and respect for various evaluative standards (models, reasons, criteria) that govern intelligibility and decision.