State-of-the-art in censorship circumvention tools
Website fingerprinting attacks use side channel information like packet sizes and directions, to enable an adversary to infer which website a victim is visiting. This can be inferred even if encrypting proxies like TOR, The Onion Router, are used. Attacks have rendered defenses ineffective, identifying websites correctly as high as 91% of the time!
In this talk Rishab Nithyanand will present his deep insight into the theoretical foundations and construction of two defenses: Gloves and Chimera. These are the first defenses that achieve strong security and overhead guarantees.
Rishab will present state-of-the-art in censorship circumvention tools and describe the many open problems to be solved.
Rishab Nithyanand is a doctoral candidate from the SPLAT (Security, Programming Languages, Algorithms, and Theory) Lab at Stony Brook University in New York where he is advised by Prof. Rob Johnson. His research interests are generally in the broad areas of security & privacy (with a theoretical flavor), and computer theory.
Along with collaborators from the SPLAT Lab and other universities, he has recently been focusing on building the first provably secure defenses against website fingerprinting attacks. His previous research topics include --Secure group association of mobile devices, Attacks on ePassport PKIs, Feasibility of using Physical Unclonable Functions for software protection, How to optimally save the world from zombie epidemics (or how to allocate passwords to accounts).