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Cables Portray Expanded Reach of Drug AgencyBy GINGER THOMPSON and SCOTT SHANE
Published: December 25, 2010

Leaked cables reveal the Drug Enforcement Administration’s global reach,
noting dealings with Lansana Kouyaté of Guinea, Ricardo Martinelli
of Panama, and Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone. Karen
Tandy, the D.E.A.’s former administrator, discussed Afghan
missions in the cables.


WASHINGTON — The Drug Enforcement Administration
has been transformed into a global intelligence organization with a
reach that extends far beyond narcotics, and an eavesdropping operation
so expansive it has to fend off foreign politicians who want to use it
against their political enemies, according to secret diplomatic cables.


In far greater detail than previously seen, the cables, from the cache obtained by WikiLeaks
and made available to some news organizations, offer glimpses of drug
agents balancing diplomacy and law enforcement in places where it can be
hard to tell the politicians from the traffickers, and where drug rings
are themselves mini-states whose wealth and violence permit them to run
roughshod over struggling governments.

Diplomats recorded unforgettable vignettes from the largely unseen war on drugs:

¶In Panama, an urgent BlackBerry message from the president to the
American ambassador demanded that the D.E.A. go after his political
enemies: “I need help with tapping phones.”

¶In Sierra Leone, a major cocaine-trafficking prosecution was almost
upended by the attorney general’s attempt to solicit $2.5 million in
bribes.

¶In Guinea, the country’s biggest narcotics kingpin turned out to be the
president’s son, and diplomats discovered that before the police
destroyed a huge narcotics seizure, the drugs had been replaced by
flour.

¶Leaders of Mexico’s beleaguered military issued private pleas for
closer collaboration with the drug agency, confessing that they had
little faith in their own country’s police forces.

¶Cables from Myanmar, the target of strict United States sanctions,
describe the drug agency informants’ reporting both on how the military
junta enriches itself with drug money and on the political activities of
the junta’s opponents.

Officials of the D.E.A. and the State Department declined to discuss
what they said was information that should never have been made public.

Like many of the cables made public in recent weeks, those describing the drug war
do not offer large disclosures. Rather, it is the details that add up
to a clearer picture of the corrupting influence of big traffickers, the
tricky game of figuring out which foreign officials are actually
controlled by drug lords, and the story of how an entrepreneurial agency
operating in the shadows of the F.B.I.
has become something more than a drug agency. The D.E.A. now has 87
offices in 63 countries and close partnerships with governments that
keep the Central Intelligence Agency at arm’s length.

Because of the ubiquity of the drug scourge, today’s D.E.A. has access
to foreign governments, including those, like Nicaragua’s and
Venezuela’s, that have strained diplomatic relations with the United
States. Many are eager to take advantage of the agency’s drug detection
and wiretapping technologies.

In some countries, the collaboration appears to work well, with the drug
agency providing intelligence that has helped bring down traffickers,
and even entire cartels. But the victories can come at a high price,
according to the cables, which describe scores of D.E.A. informants and a
handful of agents who have been killed in Mexico and Afghanistan.

In Venezuela, the local intelligence service turned the tables on the
D.E.A., infiltrating its operations, sabotaging equipment and hiring a
computer hacker to intercept American Embassy e-mails, the cables
report.

And as the drug agency has expanded its eavesdropping operations to keep
up with cartels, it has faced repeated pressure to redirect its
counternarcotics surveillance to local concerns, provoking tensions with
some of Washington’s closest allies.

Sticky Situations

Cables written in February by American diplomats in Paraguay, for
example, described the D.E.A.’s pushing back against requests from that
country’s government to help spy on an insurgent group, known as the
Paraguayan People’s Army, or the EPP, the initials of its name in
Spanish. The leftist group, suspected of having ties to the Colombian
rebel group FARC, had conducted several high-profile kidnappings and was making a small fortune in ransoms.

When American diplomats refused to give Paraguay access to the drug
agency’s wiretapping system, Interior Minister Rafael Filizzola
threatened to shut it down, saying: “Counternarcotics are important, but
won’t topple our government. The EPP could.”

The D.E.A. faced even more intense pressure last year from Panama, whose right-leaning president, Ricardo Martinelli, demanded that the agency allow him to use its wiretapping program —
known as Matador — to spy on leftist political enemies he believed were
plotting to kill him.

The United States, according to the cables, worried that Mr. Martinelli,
a supermarket magnate, “made no distinction between legitimate security
targets and political enemies,” refused, igniting tensions that went on
for months.

Mr. Martinelli, who the cables said possessed a “penchant for bullying
and blackmail,” retaliated by proposing a law that would have ended the
D.E.A.’s work with specially vetted police units. Then he tried to
subvert the drug agency’s control over the program by assigning
nonvetted officers to the counternarcotics unit.

And when the United States pushed back against those attempts — moving
the Matador system into the offices of the politically independent
attorney general — Mr. Martinelli threatened to expel the drug agency
from the country altogether, saying other countries, like Israel, would
be happy to comply with his intelligence requests.

Eventually, according to the cables, American diplomats began wondering
about Mr. Martinelli’s motivations. Did he really want the D.E.A. to
disrupt plots by his adversaries, or was he trying to keep the agency
from learning about corruption among his relatives and friends?

One cable asserted that Mr. Martinelli’s cousin helped smuggle tens of
millions of dollars in drug proceeds through Panama’s main airport every
month. Another noted, “There is no reason to believe there will be
fewer acts of corruption in this government than in any past
government.”

As the standoff continued, the cables indicate that the United States
proposed suspending the Matador program, rather than submitting to Mr.
Martinelli’s demands. (American officials say the program was suspended,
but the British took over the wiretapping program and have shared the
intelligence with the United States.)

In a statement on Saturday, the government of Panama said that it
regretted “the bad interpretation by United States authorities of a
request for help made to directly confront crime and drug trafficking.”
It said that Panama would continue its efforts to stop organized crime
and emphasized that Panama continued to have “excellent relations with
the United States.”

Meanwhile in Paraguay, according to the cables, the United States
acquiesced, agreeing to allow the authorities there to use D.E.A.
wiretaps for antikidnapping investigations, as long as they were
approved by Paraguay’s Supreme Court.

“We have carefully navigated this very sensitive and politically sticky
situation,” one cable said. “It appears that we have no other viable
choice.”

A Larger Mandate

Created in 1973, the D.E.A. has steadily built its international turf,
an expansion primarily driven by the multinational nature of the drug
trade, but also by forces within the agency seeking a larger mandate.
Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the agency’s leaders have cited what
they describe as an expanding nexus between drugs and terrorism in
further building its overseas presence.

In Afghanistan, for example, “DEA officials have become convinced that
‘no daylight’ exists between drug traffickers at the highest level and Taliban insurgents,” Karen Tandy, then the agency’s administrator, told European Union officials in a 2007 briefing, according to a cable from Brussels.

Ms. Tandy described an agency informant’s recording of a meeting in
Nangarhar Province between 9 Taliban members and 11 drug traffickers to
coordinate their financial support for the insurgency, and she said the
agency was trying to put a “security belt” around Afghanistan to block
the import of chemicals for heroin processing. The agency was embedding
its officers in military units around Afghanistan, she said. In 2007
alone, the D.E.A. opened new bureaus in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Dubai, United Arab Emirates, as well as in three Mexican cities.

Cables describe lengthy negotiations over the extradition to the United
States of the two notorious arms dealers wanted by the D.E.A. as it
reached beyond pure counternarcotics cases: Monzer al-Kassar, a Syrian
arrested in Spain, and Viktor Bout,
a Russian arrested in Thailand. Both men were charged with agreeing to
illegal arms sales to informants posing as weapons buyers for Colombian
rebels. Notably, neither man was charged with violating narcotics laws.

Late last year in a D.E.A. case, three men from Mali accused of plotting
to transport tons of cocaine across northwest Africa were charged under
a narco-terrorism statute added to the law in 2006, and they were
linked to both Al Qaeda and its North African affiliate, called Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

The men themselves had claimed the terrorism link, according to the
D.E.A., though officials told The New York Times that they had no
independent corroboration of the Qaeda connections. Experts on the
desert regions of North Africa, long a route for smuggling between
Africa and Europe, are divided about whether Al Qaeda operatives play a
significant role in the drug trade, and some skeptics note that adding
“terrorism” to any case can draw additional investigative resources and
impress a jury.

New Routes for Graft

Most times, however, the agency’s expansion seems driven more by
external forces than internal ones, with traffickers opening new routes
to accommodate new markets. As Mexican cartels take control of drug
shipments from South America to the United States, Colombian cartels
have begun moving cocaine through West Africa to Europe.

The cables offer a portrait of the staggering effect on Mali, whose
deserts have been littered with abandoned airplanes — including at least
one Boeing 727 — and Ghana, where traffickers easily smuggle drugs
through an airport’s “VVIP (Very Very Important Person) lounge.”

Top-to-bottom corruption in many West African countries made it hard for
diplomats to know whom to trust. In one 2008 case in Sierra Leone,
President Ernest Bai Koroma
moved to prosecute and extradite three South American traffickers
seized with about 1,500 pounds of cocaine, while his attorney general
was accused of offering to release them for $2.5 million in bribes.

In Nigeria, the D.E.A. reported a couple of years earlier that diplomats
at the Liberian Embassy were using official vehicles to transport drugs
across the border because they were not getting paid by their war-torn
government and “had to fend for themselves.”

A May 2008 cable from Guinea described a kind of heart-to-heart
conversation about the drug trade between the American ambassador,
Phillip Carter III, and Guinea’s prime minister, Lansana Kouyaté. At one
point, the cable said, Mr. Kouyaté “visibly slumped in his chair” and
acknowledged that Guinea’s most powerful drug trafficker was Ousmane
Conté, the son of Lansana Conté, then the president. (After the death of
his father, Mr. Conté went to prison.)

A few days later, diplomats reported evidence that the corruption ran
much deeper inside the Guinean government than the president’s son. In a
colorfully written cable — with chapters titled “Excuses, Excuses,
Excuses” and “Theatrical Production” — diplomats described attending
what was billed as a drug bonfire that had been staged by the Guinean
government to demonstrate its commitment to combating the drug trade.

Senior Guinean officials, including the country’s drug czar, the chief
of police and the justice minister, watched as officers set fire to what
the government claimed was about 350 pounds of marijuana and 860 pounds

of cocaine, valued at $6.5 million.

In reality, American diplomats wrote, the whole incineration was a sham.
Informants had previously told the embassy that Guinean authorities
replaced the cocaine with manioc flour, proving, the diplomats wrote,
“that narco-corruption has contaminated” the government of Guinea “at
the highest levels.”

And it did not take the D.E.A.’s sophisticated intelligence techniques
to figure out the truth. The cable reported that even the ambassador’s
driver sniffed out a hoax.

“I know the smell of burning marijuana,” the driver said. “And I didn’t smell anything.”

Andrew W. Lehren contributed reporting.

A version of this article appeared in print on December 26, 2010, on page A1 of the New York edition.