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London Futurists Message Board Events/Meetups › New Meetup: Cryonics UK, One Year On - An update from David Styles

New Meetup: Cryonics UK, One Year On - An update from David Styles

pleasuremodel
user 11185745
London, GB
Post #: 6
very exciting if its independantly verified - otherwise its just one guy so far - not the torrent of proof we need.
Dirk B.
user 9941666
London, GB
Post #: 199
I would certainly be a far better solution to the preservation problem.
No LN2 temps needed nor elaborate storage.
It would also be similar to modern mortuary practices.
The only downside is that there would be no physical resurrection - it's an uploading only solution.
Jonathan
Im-not-a-number
London, GB
Post #: 200
Personally, I wouldn't let anyone near my head, who can't tell the difference between an upload and a download...

On a more practical level though, Robert Ettinger - who seems to be respected as someone who knows a thing or two about Cryonics - disagrees with you in a more technical way [Quoting from Long Life (longevity through technology); Vol. 42, No. 5-6, Page 13], Here are some of his thoughts:

This was instigated by my recent second looks at some works by Uploaders, including Perry, Tipler, Moravec, and Kurzweil. Curiously, I have a lot of respect for the first two, but not much "in this context" for the latter two. Mike Perry, in particular, I believe thoroughly understands my arguments against the uploading thesis. He isn't dogmatic, he admits he might be wrong, and has many splendid things to say, such as early in Forever for All that what we should aim for in life is a preponderance of satisfaction over dissatisfaction, the meat of my book Youniverse. Cosmologist Frank Tipler makes bolder and more dogmatic statements, in The Physics of Immortality, some of which I consider clearly wrong, but still offers good food for thought. Moravec and Kurzweil, on the other hand, I think make too many obvious blunders and are basically lightweights in this area. So let me attempt in extreme brevity first to list some of the shortcomings of the Mind Uploading thesis. If there is any interest, I could follow this with more detail.

It's all old hat, of course, but there are always new people and old people with new interests. These notes are in no particular order. Identity of indiscernibles is a common tenet. Often attributed to Leibniz, one version is that if two physical objects or systems cannot be distinguished from each other by any criterion, then they must be considered the same or identical.

First, this assertion actually asserts nothing except a certain preference in use of language. It has no consequences. It is also useless because if the question arises, are A and B distinguishable, the answer is always yes. An example might be two hydrogen atoms, which some would say fill the bill. But the atoms at minimum are at different locations, hence are distinguishable, e.g. by a mass detector of appropriate sensitivity. In addition, being at different locations, they necessarily differ in other ways too, such as the gravitational fields to which they are subjected. The sufficiency of isomorphism is a pervasive and clearly wrong idea. Isomorphism means roughly same-in-form, and refers most commonly to the fact that, in a computer simulation of a physical object or system, every attribute of the original has a counterpart in the simulation, and it is therefore allowable to think that the simulation is "just as good" as the original and that a simulated person would be alive and conscious. Among other fatal afflictions, which I have spelled out in Youniverse, this idea simply assumes, without proof, that a description or representation of a thing is the "same" as the thing. In a few limited circumstances this is true, the most obvious example being a map. If two maps show the same city with equal fidelity, the maps are essentially the same and either can be used. But no map is the city.

The map is not the territory, and a description of a person, no matter how detailed and whether or not dynamic, is not the person. For an easily understood reductio ad absurdum, consider a description of a hydrogen atom, in its ground state and far removed from all other influences. Anyone, "even I", could write down, with pencil and paper, words and numbers providing a quantum mechanical description of the atom, its wave equation or equivalent. But no one will claim, I hope, that the pencil marks on paper CONSTITUTE a hydrogen atom. Yet this is exactly, in effect, what the Uploaders do claim. There is no difference, in principle, between a computer simulation of a hydrogen atom and my pencil marks on paper. In either case we just have a coded description of a physical system, which has to be interpreted.

Dirk B.
user 9941666
London, GB
Post #: 206
"Identity of indiscernibles is a common tenet. Often attributed to Leibniz, one version is that if two physical objects or systems cannot be distinguished from each other by any criterion, then they must be considered the same or identical.
First, this assertion actually asserts nothing except a certain preference in use of language. It has no consequences. "

Utterly wrong.
The consequence of identicality in QM leads directly to the correct derivation of properties of metals, most especially the correct value for specific heat. It is one of the cornerstones that distinguishes the quantum from classical world.
http://en.wikipedia.o...­

And we are supposed to listen to the critique of someone who does not even know basic physics?
Jonathan
Im-not-a-number
London, GB
Post #: 201
I can't claim your expertise in Physics; but it seems to me that since the Pauli exclusion principle rules out the possibility of two or more fermions in a system having the same quantum state, Ettinger would simply claim that a difference could be detected simply by measuring the quantum state of particles in your copy and simultaneously comparing them to the corresponding particles of the original.

Further, I'm guessing that he'd also invoke the Wootters-Zurek no-cloning theorem, to show that Bosons could not be duplicated either, and then go on to claim that any result which did produce identical particles would violate the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which underpins all of Quantum Mechanics.

Perhaps you have a better answer though?
Dirk B.
user 9941666
London, GB
Post #: 207
It's quite simple.
If you have (say) two electrons, one in an atom of helium inside the sun and another sitting in an atom of carbon in your body and you somehow exchanged them there would be absolutely no difference in the state of any system. There is no way, even in principle, of determining which electron went where originally. Or determine whether you swapped them at all. This is not true in classical physics.

Truly identical particles (or, one assumes, objects) results in different physics from ones that are in some way distinguishable.
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