In his papers "The Fixation of Belief" and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear", C. S. Peirce - arguably America's most original and influential philosopher - offers an unusual and challenging picture of truth. On this picture, truth is best understood as the projected ultimate endpoint of collective empirical research.
Peirce champions science as the adaptive, cooperative alternative to more circular and closed-minded ways of settling disagreements. We can hold as hard as possible to our preferred opinion ("tenacity"), impose somebody's preferred opinion on everybody by coercive pressure ("authority"), or let wish and imagination be our guides in crafting a worldview ("metaphysics"). All of these fail basic tests we confront in everyday life, both privately and publicly. To meet the challenges of recalcitrant experience, we need to admit that reality is not equivalent to ourselves - and this admission issues in the hypothetico-deductive methodology characteristic of the empirical sciences.
Along the way, Peirce introduces his celebrated "pragmatic maxim", later made famous by William James: to understand what our ideas mean, we need to understand how they relate to practice.
Links to the papers: