The next stage of our meander through the philosophy of mind brings us to the threshold of consciousness and the subjective character of experience.
There are two shortish articles to read for this time.
In 'Practical Ethics' Peter Singer conjectured about a 'third state', somewhere between being a person and a horse, that would allow for a comparison of a horse-existence and person-existence. What about imagining being a bat?
Thomas Nagel is sceptical that we might be able to conceive what it is like to live in a bat's world. Thomas Nagel 'What Is It Like to Be a Bat?', Philosophical Review, 83: 435-50. Reproduced in the reader edited by David J. Chalmers, Philosophy of Mind (OUP) (about £25). There are some online versions, including:
The issue of the relationship between neuroscience and philosophy has cropped up a good deal in our discussions. Thanks then to Ned Block for 'Comparing the Major Theories of Consciousness'. This can be accessed at http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/Theories_of_Consciousness.pdf