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This is going to be an online meetup using Zoom. If you've never used Zoom before, don't worry — it's easy to use and free to join.

Click on the link above at the scheduled date/time to log in...

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THE UKRAINE WAR AT 4 YEARS: (HOW) WILL IT END?

INTRODUCTION:

In this meetup, we'll look at what's happened in the Russo-Ukrainian War since the invasion began almost 4 years ago on Feb. 24, 2022 and try to predict what the most likely outcomes of this war are in the coming year, while keeping in mind the various unknowns and contingent factors. We'll also discuss how the war reports we hear in the news media and the predictions about what will happen are shaped by competing political ideologies. Much of the news media analysis suffers from what H.R. McMaster has called "strategic narcissism" - i.e. "our tendency to view the world only in relation to us, and then to assume that what the United States does, is decisive to achieving a favorable outcome.”

In this discussion, we'll do our best to avoid this sort of narcissistic bias that tries to turn the Ukrainian War into a "morality play" tied to America's culture war, and we'll try to cultivate "strategic empathy" which McMaster defines as an understanding of "the agency, the influence, the authorship over the future that others have and, in particular... the ideology and the emotions and the aspirations that drive and constrain the other, especially rivals, adversaries and enemies.” (Note: We'll also try to remember Hume's "fact-value distinction" and separate what we think *will* happen from what we *want* to happen, as well as Kant's dictum that "ought implies can".)

In the 1st section, we'll look at some arguments from pundits & analysts who are still optimistic that a battlefield reversal for Ukraine could give them the leverage needed to seal a peace treaty that will include some sort of "security guarantee" for Ukraine. Last year, there was talk of a large international peacekeeping force (~200K troops), but since the US & EU leaders have balked at permanently stationing that many troops in Ukraine, lately there's been more talk of a smaller NATO "tripwire force" (~10-20K troops) to deter future attacks. There's also some hope that foreign investment may be connected to the deal for U.S. access to Ukraine's rare earth minerals that Trump has mentioned, and some think foreign contractors might provide an implicit security guarantee, i.e. Russia wouldn't want to kill them by attacking areas where they're working. There's also still some hope for the return of some of the lost Ukrainian territories, perhaps in exchange for the lifting of Western sanctions on Russia. These pro-Ukraine optimists often believe that Russia's economy is teetering on the brink of collapse due to sanctions and Ukraine's drone attacks on Russia's refineries, and that given some more pressure (e.g. seizing Russia's "shadow fleet" tankers, using Russia's frozen assets to fund Ukraine) Putin will be forced to make serious concessions to Ukraine.

In the 2nd section, we'll look at some arguments from pundits & analysts who think that the most likely course is a military stalemate that leads to a peace treaty or ceasefire based on Ukraine's "armed neutrality" - i.e. continued Western military aid rather but no security guarantees from NATO. (This outcome is sometimes referred to as "Finlandization" because it resembles Finland's officially neutral status during the Cold War after it lost territory to the Soviet Union during the WW2.) This scenario often assumes we'll see either frozen battle lines or some territorial concessions by Ukraine in its 4 eastern oblasts - Dontesk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia - that Russia formally annexed back in Sept. 2022 and which Russian forces now mostly (~75%) control. Although this outcome is less ideal than the one described in the 1st section, some analysts still see it in a relatively optimistic light and hope that it may lead to reduced tensions between the West & Russia. (Last year, we discussed the possibility that this could fit into Trump's purported attempt to pull off a "reverse Nixon" move that would split Russia and China, similar to how Nixon's visit to China in 1972 exploited the Sino-Soviet split, but most pundits appear to agree this looks unlikely due to Russia's growing dependence on China amid Western sanctions.)

In the 3rd section, we'll look at some arguments from pundits & analysts who think that it's unlikely that we'll see any peace treaty or lasting ceasefire, and that Russia will probably continue its slow & costly conquest of eastern Ukraine. The key detail they'll point to is Russia's numerical advantage in troops and Ukraine's recruitment & desertion crises, and the fact that Western aid isn't accompanied by any sign so far that NATO troops will be deployed into Ukraine. While some pessimists are still claiming Russian forces could eventually push all the way to the Dnipro River, others are suggesting Russia may opt instead to take the port cities Odessa & Mykolaiv, leaving Ukraine as an independent but impoverished "rump state" cut off from the Black Sea and linking Russian territories in southern Ukraine up with Transnistrian separatists in Moldova. However, there's a debate about whether Russia will be exhausted by the effort, perhaps due to Ukrainian forces switching to guerrilla tactics. Under this scenario, some think Russia would not want to risk invading NATO countries, preferring instead to use its typical "hybrid warfare" methods like election interference, cyberattacks, propaganda meant to sew divisions, and sponsorship of right-wing Euroskeptic parties. However, there's also fears that if Russia rapidly recovers from its battlefield losses in Ukraine, Trump's disengagement from NATO could embolden Russia enough to launch an attack on a NATO country (e.g. one of the Baltic state or Finland) within the next few years, sparking a broader conflict in Europe that could quickly escalate into World War 3.

Of course, each of these 3 scenarios contains multiple components, so it's quite possible that what we'll see in reality will be a mix. For example, we may see the Russian economic crisis mentioned in the 1st section alongside a treaty that puts Ukraine formally into the "armed neutrality" described in the 2nd section, but that instead of detente with Russia we see more of the "hybrid war" described in the 3rd section.

WHAT'S THE DISTRIBUTION OF OPINIONS AMONG FOREIGN POLICY EXPERTS?

We should start by noting that while we can get the opinions of various military leaders & foreign policy experts in news coverage of the war, it's hard to get a sense of the broader expert consensus (if one exists) because there hasn't been a poll of international relations scholars that I'm aware of aside from the College of William & Mary's TRIP Program SNAP polls in March 2022 and July 2023. Those polls merely revealed that most IR scholars thought the US should sanction Russia and send military aid to Ukraine, but should not try to implement a no-fly zone and should avoid direct NATO-Russia conflict. It also showed they were concerned the "nuclear taboo" was being weakened for Russia, and that the abortive Wagner Group rebellion in June 2023 showed an instability that might make this worse. However, many also thought the Wagner incident suggested the likelihood of Russia losing the Ukraine conflict and/or leadership change occurring in Russia was higher than before. A later SNAP poll in May 2025 showed that, based on Trump first 100 days in office, the majority thought Trump's handling of Ukraine (i.e. rebuffing Zelensky) raised the odds that China might use military force against Taiwan and worsened the reputation of the U.S. as a reliable security partner.

However, I was able to find some Ukraine War forecasts that might act as a rough proxy for the Western foreign policy consensus that involves forecasts with several scenarios:

The graphic at the top of this page comes from a July 2024 article by the Economist Intelligence Unit entitled "Ukraine scenarios: what will happen under Trump?" that predicted: (1) Baseline Forecast: war continues but Europe fails to compensate for lower US aid, resulting in an eventual bad peace deal ["towards the end of the forecast period", i.e. 2028-2029] forced on Ukraine (50%); (2) Alternative scenario 1: frozen conflict, with a fragile ceasefire persisting but no peace deal (40%); (3) Alternative scenario 2: Europe steps up, delivering enough aid to push Russia back (10%). They also considered a number of alternative scenarios deemed unlikely to which they didn't assign probabilities: (4) a peace deal in 2025, in which Russia ends up with formal control of most of the territory that it currently controls; (5) Putin angers Trump and US directs even more resources to Ukraine; or (6) Europe does not increase funding once the US draws back, resulting in a forced peace deal on terms that are unfavorable to Ukraine "midway through the forecast period" [i.e. 2026-2027].

JP Morgan Chase's Center for Geopolitics issued a report in May 2025 entitled "The Russia-Ukraine Endgame and the Future of Europe" that included the following scenarios: (1) Best case – “South Korea” style security guarantee + major Western support (15%); (2) Still OK – “Israel” style major Western support without security guarantee (20%); (3) Not great – “Georgia” style rump state with declining Western support (50%); (4) Worst case – “Belarus” style puppet state of Russia (15%).

The think tank GLOBSEC issued a report in June 2025 entitled "Seven Security Scenarios on Russian War in Ukraine for 2025 - 2026" that included the following scenarios: (1) Hybrid World War III with Conflicts in Ukraine, Middle East, Asia, Caucasus, Balkans (20%); (2) Continued War of Attrition at Current Intensity with Optimal Western Support (13%); (3) Continued War of Attrition with Russian Gains after Drop in Western Support (4%); (4) War of Attrition with Lowered Intensity due to Resource Drain (38%); (5) Ceasefire & Peace Process under Conditions Unacceptable to Ukraine (11%); (6) Ceasefire with Patchy Peace Process under Conditions Acceptable to Ukraine & Russia (12%); (7) Ceasefire & Peace Process which Addresses Ukraine's Interests & Security (2%).

NOTE: If you're interested, The Military Show Youtube channel turned GLOBSEC's report into a 25-minute video - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SRdMzzmeWj4

WHAT DO PREDICTION MARKETS & FORECASTING TOURNAMENTS SUGGEST?

- Polymarket currently has a variety of predictions for the Ukraine War, most notably the chance of a Russia x Ukraine ceasefire by end of 2026 at 44%, the chance of Zelenskyy out as Ukraine president by end of 2026 at 26%, and the chance of Putin out as President of Russia by end of 2026 at 12%.

- Manifold Markets also has a variety of predictions for the Ukraine War, such as a 32% chance the Russia-Ukraine war end before the end of 2026, a 31% chance the war in Ukraine end before 2027, a 79% chance of a ceasefire in Ukraine by July 1, 2027 (rising to 84% by Jan. 1, 2028), and a 58% chance that Zelenskyy be in power at the conclusion of the Russia-Ukraine war.

- Kalshi has less predictions for Ukraine, but does give the chance of Zelensky out as president of Ukraine by Oct. 1, 2026 at 22%.

- Metaculus currently has some predictions for the Ukraine war, including a median estimate of a bilateral ceasefire or peace agreement in the Russo-Ukraine conflict by May 2027 and a 50% chance of a peace treaty with the Russian Federation by the end of 2030.

- Good Judgement Open has some predictions for the Ukraine War under its "Global Armed Conflict in 2026", including a 72% chance that Kostyantynivka [Donetsk oblast] will not be under Russian control before Aug. 21, 2026, a 63% chance that Pokrovsk [Donetsk oblast] will not be under Russian control before Aug. 21, 2026, and a 67% chance that Kupiansk [Kharkiv oblast] will not be under Russian control before Aug. 21, 2026.

RELEVANT MATERIAL FROM PAST MEETUPS:

In Oct. 2021, we had a meetup entitled "Can We Predict Geopolitical Conflict?" We looked at how to predict the onset of wars, WMD development & usage, military coups & popular revolts, as well as civil wars & genocide. We tried to apply some of Phil Tetlock's tips for geopolitical forecasting, like: (1) break seemingly intractable problems into tractable sub-problems, using Fermi estimates, (2) strike the right balance between "inside" (event-specific) and "outside" (reference class) views, (3) strike the right balance between under- and overreacting to new evidence, by using Bayesian-style updating, and (4) look for the clashing causal forces at work in each problem, and consider multiple theories & models.

In a meetup back in April 2022, we talked about different frameworks for understanding the Ukraine conflict (neoliberal, critical, realist, constructivist) and noted how they roughly align with different U.S. political factions (establishment Democrats & neocons, progressive activists, establishment Republicans, right-wing populists).

In Feb. 2023, we looked at the probabilities for 4 different outcomes for the "The Ukraine War after 1 Year" - Russian victory, Ukrainian victory, stalemate/frozen conflict, direct NATO-Russian conflict - and then in Mar. 2024 we had a meetup entitled "The Ukraine War at 2 Years" where we reevaluated the probabilities of these 4 outcomes after the failed Ukrainian offensive in summer 2023 and the abortive Wagner Group rebellion.

In Feb. 2024, we had a meetup entitled "The Ukraine War at 3 Years: (How) Will It End?" where we discussed 4 possible endings with Trump in office: (1) peace treaty with some sort of US/NATO "security guarantee" for Ukraine; (2) peace treaty or ceasefire that freezes current battle lines based on Ukraine's "armed neutrality"; (3) slow conquest of southeastern Ukraine, possibly leaving a "rump state", that leaves Russia too exhausted to threaten NATO; (4) Russia completely conquering Ukraine or turning it into a "puppet state" - possibly leading to Russian invasion of a NATO country. (Today's outline is similar but combines Sections 3 & 4 from the old outline.)

DIRECTIONS ON HOW TO PREPARE FOR OUR DISCUSSION:

The videos & articles you see linked below are intended to give you a basic overview of some of the major debates over ongoing developments in the Ukraine War and possible ways the war might end. As usual, I certainly don't expect you to read all the articles prior to attending our discussion. The easiest way to prepare for our discussion is to just watch the numbered videos linked under each section - the videos come to about 60 minutes total. The articles marked with asterisks are just there to supply additional details. You can browse and look at whichever ones you want, but don't worry - we'll cover the stuff you missed in our discussion.

In terms of the discussion format, my general idea is that we'll address the topics in the order presented here. I've listed some questions under each section to stimulate discussion. We'll do our best to address most of them, as well as whatever other questions our members raise. I figure we'll spend about 40 minutes on each section.

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I. POSSIBLE ENDING #1: A BATTLEFIELD REVERSAL IN UKRAINE'S FAVOR AND/OR ECONOMIC CRISIS IN RUSSIA ULTIMATELY LEADS TO PEACE TREATY WITH DE FACTO SECURITY GUARANTEE FOR UKRAINE, ALONG WITH WESTERN INVESTMENT & (POSSIBLY) SOME REGAINED TERRITORIES

  • Considering Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges and Gen. David Petraeus thought in Jan. 2023 that Ukraine could reconquer both the Donbas and Crimea by the fall of 2023, does this suggest they're permanently over-optimistic, or is their current optimism more grounded in today's battlefield conditions?
  • Russian forces are advancing slowly but steadily at high cost. Is that evidence of failure—or evidence that their attrition strategy is working?
  • Which matters more in a long war: total population/manpower (which favors Russia) or casualty ratios (which favors Ukraine)?
  • Are Ukrainian drones primarily defensive (as Kavanagh argues) or capable of enabling offensive breakthroughs (as Petraeus argues)?
  • Do Ukraine’s strikes on Russian energy infrastructure meaningfully affect the war—or mostly create nuisance costs?
  • If Russia’s economy is stagnating but not collapsing, is that enough to force strategic concessions?
  • Could the US & EU put more pressure on Russia by seizing its "shadow fleet" oil tankers that allow it to evade sanctions, or at least get European countries to stop buying Russian oil & gas? If so, why hasn't that already been done?
  • Could the US & EU use Russia's frozen assets to fund Ukraine's war effort? If so, why hasn't that already been done?
  • Is a bad peace deal now worse for Ukraine than continued war? How should we weigh human costs vs strategic consequences?
  • Could Western contractors in Ukraine provide a limited but effective security guarantee, or would this require a small NATO "tripwire force" or perhaps a large NATO peacekeeping force? And what if the latter option is politically infeasible in the EU/US or liable to preclude any peace deal with Russia?

1a) New Front w/ David Petraeus, "The Ukraine War Is Rewriting Power Balance as Russia Faces Strategic Failure" (video - 9:31 min)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xaIV0wyjNe4

1b) New Front w/ Ben Hodges "The Kremlin Loses Everything It Built - Ukraine Overtakes The Russian Economy" (video - 9:07 min.)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a-7hQj-BdGs

II. POSSIBLE ENDING #2: MILITARY STALEMATE LEADS TO PEACE TREATY OR FROZEN CONFLICT WITH ARMED NEUTRALITY (A.K.A. "FINLANDIZATION") & POSSIBLE E.U. MEMBERSHIP FOR UKRAINE BASED ON CURRENT BATTLE LINES OR MILD TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS IN DONBAS

  • Although Gen. Mark Milley thought that Russia could conquer Ukraine in 72 hours back in Jan. 2022, did his assessment in Nov. 2022 that Ukraine couldn't retake the lost territory in its eastern oblasts suggest he saw conditions more accurately than Hodges & Petraeus?
  • How confident are we that the war has reached a long-term strategic stalemate rather than a temporary phase?
  • Would ceding the remaining territory in the Donbas including the "Fortress Belt" reduce the risk of future war — or increase it?
  • Why would Russia agree to stop fighting now if it believes time favors it? What would change its incentives?
  • How much should past Russian treaty violations influence whether negotiations are trusted today?
  • How credible are Western security guarantees without NATO membership?
  • Is “armed neutrality” a viable long-term security model for Ukraine — or a recipe for future war?
  • Which Cold War analogy fits divided Ukraine best: Korea, Finland, Germany, or none? Would a divided Ukraine be more akin to Georgia or Moldova?

2a) WSJ w/ James Marson, "The 30-Mile Barrier Preventing Russia From Taking More of Ukraine" (video - 4:53 min.)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pls6Btwm6Qo

2b) Al Arabiya English w/ Oleksandr Merezhko, Brandon Weicher & Michael Fallon, "Ukraine Could Be Like South Korea’: Will Ukraine Concede Land to End the War?" (video - 53:11 min, listen to 20:00)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sh51t9Er1Wg

III. POSSIBLE ENDING #3: NO PEACE TREATY - RUSSIA CONTINUES SLOW CONQUEST OF EASTERN UKRAINE, POSSIBLY TAKING ODESSA & LEAVING A "RUMP STATE", LEAVING RUSSIA TO RAMP UP ITS "HYBRID WAR" WITH E.U. - OR POSSIBLY INVADE A EUROPEAN COUNTRY, IF U.S. DISENGAGES FROM NATO

  • Is John Mearsheimer's assessment now more likely to be right since he accurately predicted in Sept. 2015 that Western efforts to integrate Ukraine into NATO & the EU would provoke a Russian invasion that would "wreck" Ukraine?
  • To what extent should we discount Gen. Douglas Macgregor's pessimistic take on Ukraine's chances given that he predicted they'd lose the war quickly in 2022?
  • Many pessimistic analysts assume population size determines attrition outcomes. Is that historically true? What wars challenge this assumption?
  • At what point does a war of attrition become a war of political endurance rather than military strength? Which side looks more resilient politically right now?
  • Could Russia realistically capture Odessa militarily or force Ukraine to concede Odessa in negotiations? And if Ukraine permanently loses access to the Black Sea, is it still a viable long-term state?
  • Would a peace deal in Ukraine make a NATO-Russia war more likely in the next decade because it would free up military resources, or could it deescalate tensions between NATO & Russia if done properly?
  • Which scenario seems most plausible in the next decade: a full Russian invasion of a NATO country, a limited “test” incursion, or a long-term hybrid warfare campaign as Russia rebuilds its military?

3a) Glenn Diesen w/ John Measheimer, "The Ukraine War is Coming to an End - NATO Lost" (video - 11:06 min)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WqcNamrGn00

3b) Cyrus Janssen w/ Col. Douglas McGregor, "Colonel Douglas Macgregor Reveals How Ukraine War Ends in 2026" (video - 21:48 min, start at 16:10)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Psl6Uc3qXAY&t=381s

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