Continue Discussing Steven Pinker’s Rationality

On March 21, 2026, our group of four continued our exploration of Steven Pinker’s Rationality. In this discussion, we jumped into the Monty Hall problem. Monty Hall was the host of a game show, Let’s Make a Deal, where in one deal, a contestant is shown three doors of which one has a sports car and the other two have goats. The contestant picks door number 1. Monty shows what’s behind door number 3 revealing a goat. Monty offers the contestant the opportunity to change. Should the contestant change from door 1 to door 2? Marilyn Vos Savant said switch doors to improve the chances of getting the sports car, and her answer raised the ire of mathematicians who argued to stay with the door 1. Pinker explained Vos Savant’s solution by putting the car and two goats in all possible combinations, and assume that Monty would always pick the door that had the goat. Combination A has door 1 with the car, and doors 2 and 3 have goats. Combination B, doors 1 and 3 have the goat and door 2 has the car. Combination C, doors 1 and 3 have goats and door 2 has the car. If you stayed with door 1, only combination A would give you the car. However, for combinations B and C, switching will give you the car. Switching gives the odds of ⅔ where staying gives you ⅓.

Pinker said that knowledge is justified belief, but is certainty knowledge? In the Monty Hall problem, is knowing the odds considered knowledge? One of us proposed Descartes’ “I think, therefore I am” as certainty. Monty Hall knows what is behind the three doors. The contestant acquires limited knowledge when Monty opens a door. Would knowing that switching doors would give you ⅔ odds be considered knowledge? For that matter, are we all contestants with limited and contingent knowledge?

Furthermore, are the forms of arguments that we discussed time a way of knowing? Are the truth tables for the connectors AND/OR conventions derived from linguistic sense of the words used for connectors? Do these forms of argument give us certainty? When an argument is invalidly used, fallacies guide us away from the wrong conclusions. The fallacies corresponding to modus ponens and modus tollens are Affirming the Consequent and Denying the Antecedent, respectively. A Modus Ponens fallacy is affirming the consequent is if P, then Q. Q is true. Therefore, P must be true. For example, "If it rains, the ground is wet. The ground is wet. Therefore, it rained." (Invalid: The ground could be wet from sprinklers). A Modus Tollens fallacy is denying the antecedent is if P, then Q. P is false. Therefore, Q must be false. An example is "If I am in London, I am in England. I am not in London. Therefore, I am not in England." (Invalid: I could be in Manchester).

The straw man fallacy follows a specific pattern of distortion: Person A states position X.
Person B ignores position X and replaces it with a distorted, extreme version—position Y.
Person B attacks position Y, acting as though they have invalidated X. For example:
Person A: "I think we should put more money into education and health." Person B: "I cannot believe you want to leave our country defenseless by cutting all military spending!"
Person B misrepresents, exaggerates, or fabricates Person A’s argument to make it easier to attack. Instead of engaging with the actual, nuanced position, they dismantle a weak "straw man" version. It is a common tactic in debates to avoid addressing the real issue.
There are other fallacies to consider and can probability allow us to become more knowledgeable? We invite you to find out more about Steven Pinker’s Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters, BF441.P56 2021on April 11, 2026, from 2 PM to 4 PM.