Let Us Prey? A Debate on whether rational self interest means harming others.

Ayn Rand wrote the book on the virtue of selfishness, but contrary to popular
connotations of the word, said that one's rational interests do not conflict with those of others. One who preys on others becomes dependent on their weakness and fails to develop one's own productivity. One becomes a "second hander."

However, many thinkers outside of Objectivism continue to press the point. They claim that one can sacrifice oneself to others in isolated instances without losing the capacity to produce for oneself. Moreover, the majority of governments in world history have provided the opportunity to "mooch" or "loot" without consequence, and often without social disapproval.

This month's salon will have a different format than most. We will host a debate between Atlas Society philosopher Will Thomas and GMU law professor Ilya Somin. This will constitute 40 minutes of the salon. The remainder will consist of Q&A and then discussion including both the audience and the guests.

From Will's post on the FAQ page of TAS (https://ayn-rand.info/... (https://ayn-rand.info/cth-32-2158-HarmonyFAQ.aspx))

"Objectivism holds that there are no fundamental conflicts of interest among rational people. That is to say that the success in life of one person does not require the suffering or failure of any other. It means that, in principle, all people can succeed in living long and happy lives, if they live by reason, embrace the virtue of productiveness, and deal with one another by trade...Objectivism’s ethics of rational selfishness is not an ethics of dog-eat-dog because of the harmony of interests. A political system based in individual rights to freedom—i.e., capitalism—does not pit the “haves” against the “have-nots” because of the harmony of interests. "

Ilya writes that:

"A morality that endorses selfishness as its highest value faces serious objections. For example, it would justify stealing if you can get away with it. It would condemn many of the dissidents who resisted communism, because most of them certainly didn't enjoy spending time in Gulags. From a self-interested standpoint, the dissidents would have been better off pretending to be loyal communists. There are far too many such cases to dismiss them as aberrations, and even if they are exceptional, they have so much practical importance that a theory of morality has to account for them in some more effective way than simply saying that they are exceptions. Many Objectivists answer objections like these primarily by expanding the definition of self-interest to the point where it's no longer a meaningful concept, or using an overly expansive definition of "happiness." Acting on one's self-interest is often defensible and sometimes even praiseworthy. But it cannot be the foundation of all social morality."

Some refreshments will be provided, but we always encourage more. This meetup will be free. For directions and parking advice, consult GMU's law school page here: https://www.law.gmu.ed... (https://www.law.gmu.edu/about/parking) and the map here https://info.gmu.edu/A... (https://info.gmu.edu/ArlingtonMap10.pdf).

Here are some issues to think about that may or may not be the debaters' main points. We can still discuss them after the debate, time permitting.

1. Are the Objectivist virtues ends in themselves in addition to being means to the larger end of life? (If so, the virtues would seem to preclude predation).
2. Does self-interest entail working toward a society in which individuals can thrive?
3. What role does empathy play? If humans have sympathy for others, does that imply that one should tailor one's habits towards symbiotic relations to others, or does one derive the Objectivist ethics without regard for empathy?
4. How variable is human psychology? Is it possible for someone to be happy as a predator? Does Objectivism depend on empirical psychology to make the claim that predation is not in one's self-interest?
5. How should one act in the all-too-common social systems where people routinely benefit at the expense of others? Should Objectivists defect in "prisoner's dilemmas"?