Indecent Disclosures: Anti-Corruption Reforms and Political Selection

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Cracking down on corruption has become a key tool for politicians to build popular support. But little is known about whether anti-corruption measure actually change politicians’ behavior. Prof. David Szakonyi (https://www.davidszakonyi.com/) evaluates the electoral effects of a common reform – mandatory financial disclosures – using a quasi-experimental design on 26,048 elections in Putin-era Russia. David Szakonyi find that incumbents are less likely to seek re-election if, upon winning, they will have to reveal their wealth.