China - United States Cross Cultural Investments & FDI amid rising tensions...

"United States & China Relationship: FDI and Cross Cultural Investment in a Time of Realpolitik Tensions..."

Significant socio-economic and political changes within China are evidenced through the five main factors elaborated in detail following this. And these changes reflect to the relationships of China with the rest of the world and especially with the United States which is tasked with maintaining stability and security globally...

Because of these changes we have convened a major Forum through the Churchill Society in Seattle, in order to openly discuss the realities of Cross Cultural people to people Investments, and the general commercial & business cooperation, through the lens of the "Invest in USA" programs that allow Chinese Investors to gain a Green Card by investing in the United States in a way that creates jobs directly.

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In this Churchill Society Forum we are keen to focus on the people, because the human exchanges, always trump State posturing and policy initiatives, and right now the people from both sides of the Pacific have been able to built and hold a rather special relationship.

Therefore we want to invite you to participate in our next Churchill Society event in Washington State, taking place on Thursday evening, the 19th of November 2015. It is an event focused entirely on Business, Economics, FDI, cross-cultural and TransPacific investments, and on the EB-5 program of Investor's visas into the USA and into the Pacific Northwest, at a time of global and regional uncertainty amid mounting tensions.

All these factors contribute to the OPPORTUNITIES stemming from the problems ahead, that in turn cause anxieties that drive Chinese Investors and many other people to invest abroad... in the safe harbor the United States represent, and specifically Washington State that has been christened the official Gateway to China...

At this point in time, many mainland Chinese Investors are making a beeline for the Exits -- in order to avoid both the depreciation of the Yuan and the Capital Controls increasingly evident in China, as well as the autocratic regime. Thus today we have an influx of wealthy Investors who want to take up the American EB-5 Investor visa in order to secure an alternative & safe future for themselves and their families.

This turn of events, although inconvenient and unfortunate for many people -- it also represents a liquidity shift towards these shores, and reverses a trend that for thirty years saw Foreign Direct Investment flowing to China. Now this change of "weather" brings much needed investment in the United States and it flows directly into our early stage Technology Enterprises, at the earliest Angel level, and on up to advanced Life Science and High Technology companies...

For this side of the Pacific, this can be seen as a rather propitious event because it can serve our growth well, since this source of FDI represents fresh capital that can be directed to Tech and Life Science companies, as an alternative to the Venture Capital in the Pacific Northwest...

American Angels has built a direct pipeline to that "source" of FDI, and we aim to direct it to the new Technology and Life Science Enterprises of our members. The ways to reach this fast increasing resource in order to put it to use for our Enterprises and our Economic development, is the essence of this evening's discussions and investor networking.

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"This is the best People and Investors from both sides of the Pacific coming together to help further each other's aims, and realize their mutual dreams, and aspirations..." according to Dr Pano Kroko, head of the American Angels organization.

So join us as we discuss our common future as intelligent human beings living on both sides of the Pacific. Come join us, in a stellar event that is sponsored through the Churchill Society, the American Angels, the China Embassy, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Council of Foreign Relations, the TAI initiative, the Asia Pacific Business Forum, and many others.

Each Year the United States benefits through approximately 10,000 applications from Chinese Investors for EB-5 visas... This translates roughly to some Eleven Billion Dollars in Foreign Direct Investment into the United States....

Many people want to kill this Golden Goose but we ought to resist this short sighted Immigration pseudo patriotism. Nativism and isolationism, hasn't worked economically for anyone across the world in the past and is not going to work now. The TPP will see to that conclusively.

Join us for Networking and Meeting the people responsible for some of our best FDI and cross cultural Investment decisions and flows of Capital, across the vast Pacific ocean.

There are important and knowledgable Speakers, panelists, investors, and entrepreneurs, from both sides of the Pacific at this event and they will delve into the issues deeply.

Ambassador Gary Locke [Ex=Governor of Washington State], and Dow Constantine [Executive of King County], and the Chinese Ambassador, have all been invited...

Dr Kroko and Mr Wang Shi, along with the Mayor of Bellevue Ms Claudia Paducci, and Seattle's Mr Ed Murray and others... have also been invited to converse.

We also have drinks and food at this facility, and the talks will be followed by a full networking session, and several Transpacific Companies & Investment opportunity overviews.

The website of the event is bellow, and we welcome You to join us in our high profile Investors meeting at the Stone Lounge on Bellevue Avenue near the Bellevue Hyatt Hotel.

Additionally we hope that you will invite your F&F, your colleagues, your business or political contacts, and certainly the US-China Investors, who live in the area, because the Churchill Society offers a great Forum for Open Unfettered Discussions of well chosen Socio-Economic and Political topics, with ultimate emphasis on getting to the Truth through learning the Facts, and the Data sets.

All discussions are under Chatham House rules and thus we promote openness and transparency.

Use the hashtag #churchillsociety and your twitter to expose others to the event.

Share on your Social Media as well under Churchill Society.

https://www.meetup.com/ChurchillSociety/

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China's Socio-Economic and International Policies today -- pivot around these five key factors...

1. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE RENMINBI -- The stagnating economic growth, the Renminbi devaluations, the increasing militarization of the Chinese society, the rising sovereignty tensions in the South China Sea, and the rising tide of military competition with Japan, along with the current wave of prosecutions of the wealthy and the powerful members of the old Chinese elites -- all cause grave concern for the wealthy Chinese class of Individual Investors, who see their liberties curtailed and their fortunes being severely and certainly diminished.

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2. CHINA - TAIWAN SUMMIT -- The announcement that Chinese President Xi Jinping and Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou will hold a historic summit in Singapore on November 7 came as a total surprise. While the meeting, which will be the first between leaders of the mainland and Taiwan since 1949, represents a monumental breakthrough in cross-strait relations, many questions remain unanswered as to the intent and outcome of this summit... And now after the momentous meeting -- we still don't know very much of what was discussed, but the thaw in the relations between the two Chinas, is already evident.

3. ANTI-CORRUPTION REGIME -- The Anti-corruption campaign in China is a far-reaching campaign against corruption which began in China following the conclusion of the 18th National Congress (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/18th_National_Congress_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China) of the Communist Party of China (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_China). Held in November 2012...

4. RISING TENSIONS WITH JAPAN -- The ramifications for China-Japan relations of the recent change in Constitution to allow Japan to take part in foreign wars, and the efforts by Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe with advancing reconciliation of the immediate neighborhood are all contributing to the rising worries and tensions...

5. PRESIDENT XI LEADERSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL POWER LEGACY -- President Xi's foreign policy may cause consternation amongst China's neighbors, and his foreign and economic policies upset the apple carts of most world powers -- but by 2020 President Xi will probably be the world's most powerful figure leading the world's most powerful nation, looking to expand its sphere of dominance to its historical limits if not beyond...

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For further reading continue bellow:

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CHALLENGES:

1. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE RENMINBI

As a primer of the Chinese currency devaluations and the Capital Flight we must see this reading of the situation bellow:

Why China devalues it's currency?

The answer to this and other questions can be found in the efforts at Renminbi's Internationalization as seen by the Chinese economic policy.

China’s central bank devalued its currency last months, sending major stock markets in Asia and Europe down, and sparking fears of additional exchange rate devaluations in other countries. It is the largest devaluation in China’s system in over 20 years. When reading news and analysis of this event, you might see both terms—“renminbi” and “yuan”—used interchangeably.

What’s the difference between the renminbi and the yuan?

There is essentially no difference. The renminbi is the official currency of the People’s Republic of China, and translates to “people’s money.” Its international symbol is CNY (or CNH in Hong Kong; but abbreviated RMB, with the symbol ¥).

The yuan is the name of the unit in which renminbi transactions are denominated, but also refers to the currency generally. Thus, a person might pay for a meal using a 20 yuan banknote, and get some yuan and jiao (a tenth of a yuan) in change (the jiao is further divided into 10 fen). But it is all renminbi. This is similar to the pound sterling, which is the name of the British currency, while the price of a pint of beer in a London pub would be stated just in pounds.

Yet the answer to many economic questions is still The efforts at Renminbi's Internationalization...

As we saw that China’s central bank devalued its currency last months, sending major stock markets in Asia and Europe down, and sparking fears of additional exchange rate devaluations in other countries, we remain alert for more of the same downwards economic value trends... And although this was the largest devaluation in China’s system in over 20 years, when reading news and analysis of this event, you need to think Renminbi's internationalization.

The yuan is the name of the unit in which renminbi transactions are denominated, but also refers to the currency generally. Thus, a person might pay for a meal using a 20 yuan banknote, and get some yuan and jiao (a tenth of a yuan) in change (the jiao is further divided into 10 fen). But it is all renminbi. This is similar to the pound sterling, which is the name of the British currency, while the price of a pint of beer in a London pub would be stated just in pounds.

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The new international role of the renminbi is the main global economic project of the Chinese Economy planners.

In terms of size and dynamism, the economy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) stands out among the emerging markets. It has already become the world’s second-largest economy and is now one of the largest contributors to global growth. If the PRC continues on its present growth track, it may soon takeover from the United States as the world’s largest economy.

These developments have led to intense speculation that the renminbi will soon become one of the major international currencies.

In this gathering we examine the issues in-depth. Through an examination of the monetary and financial issues associated with the currency’s internationalization, the book emphasizes the many reasons the international community should welcome the emergence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a source of global liquidity. However, making the renminbi a global currency will require rebalancing the Chinese economy, developing the country’s financial markets and opening them to the rest of the world, and moving to a more flexible exchange rate.

Eventually, the internationalization of the renminbi will enable the PRC to be an alternative supplier of safe assets to the rest of the world in which firms, households, and central banks can park their savings, where they will later be available in case of a need for more liquid funding. The editors of “Renminbi Internationalization,” Barry Eichengreen and Masahiro Kawai, write:

“The world welcomes the PRC’s emergence as a source of global liquidity…For more than half a century, the U.S. dollar has been the source of that liquidity, with U.S. Treasury obligations constituting the single largest and most liquid financial market in the world…. Other sources of international liquidity will have to be developed to supplement the United States and its dollar. The PRC and its RMB are obvious candidates. Thus, the future of globalization may well turn on the success of the PRC’s efforts to internationalize the RMB.”

"The Internationalization of the Renminbi" is a good read for anyone who wants to know more about the complex issues surrounding one of the major international and regional financial developments of our time.“

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2. CHINA - TAIWAN SUMMIT

In 1992, China and Taiwan held a historic meeting in Singapore. The two representatives were close personal friends of the Chinese and Taiwanese presidents at that time. They hammered out a convoluted statement that basically said, “we agree to disagree” about the nature of the cross-strait relationship. However imprecise and frustrating, this statement gave China enough cover to engage in dialogue with Taiwan without giving up its sovereignty claims, and it allowed Taiwan to insist that it is a sovereign state.

Twenty-three years later, the question is whether President Xi and President Ma can do better...

Realistically, we should expect no more than a reiteration of the 1992 statement. Anything beyond that will not be accepted by the Taiwanese voters.

The announcement that Chinese President Xi Jinping and Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou will hold a historic summit in Singapore on November 7 came as a total surprise. While the meeting, which will be the first between leaders of the mainland and Taiwan since 1949, represents a monumental breakthrough in cross-strait relations, many questions remain unanswered as to the intent and outcome of this summit.

Chinese and Taiwanese officials did, however, reach one clever semantic compromise. In the past, the most difficult hurdle for holding high-level official meetings between China and Taiwan has been Taiwan’s status. China insisted that Taiwanese officials either participate in their non-official capacities or present themselves as officials of a “provincial” or “regional” government, implicitly acknowledging the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) sovereignty over the Republic of China (ROC), which is Taiwan’s formal name.

But this time, China apparently has made an important concession. Beijing’s announcement of the summit states that “leaders from both sides of the Taiwan Strait” will meet. Presidents Xi and Ma will also address each other as “Mister” (xiansheng in Chinese). The gesture acknowledges that the two officials are meeting in their official capacities (as leaders of two geographic areas) while avoiding the intractable sovereignty dispute.

Mainland China's President Xi also has a compelling political reason to showcase his leadership and meet with Taiwan. With a struggling economy and an anti-corruption campaign that has made him unpopular with the bureaucracy, Xi needs to replenish his political capital. A landmark summit with Taiwan could offer that benefit. It demonstrates Xi’s bold leadership, particularly since such a meeting would have been inconceivable under his less decisive and powerful predecessors. Xi is also concerned that, should the DPP recapture the presidency in Taiwan next January, he would risk criticism of doing nothing to prevent such an outcome.

Unfortunately, if Beijing believes that a Xi-Ma summit will dramatically change Taiwan’s electoral dynamics two months before the election, they are being too optimistic. Yes, the historic meeting will likely improve the political fortunes of Ma’s party, the Kuomintang (KMT). But given the insurmountable lead of the opposition candidate, Tsai Ying-wen, who now enjoys a 20 percentage-point advantage in the latest opinion polls, the summit will not likely upend Taiwan’s presidential race.

If Chinese leaders are as sophisticated as most people believe, they must have another longer-term objective for the summit aside from attempting to influence Taiwan’s voters.

The conventional wisdom is that the Xi-Ma meeting is no more than a symbolic event. At one level, this is undoubtedly true. It is hard to imagine any substantive deals, President Ma, a lame-duck president, can actually agree to. So, it’s more useful to focus on the language that is used to define the relationship between Taiwan and China.

The admirable flexibility demonstrated by Xi and Ma raises another question: why now and what do they hope to accomplish with the summit?

The timing of the gathering is significant for both presidents. President Ma, who is scheduled to step down in March 2016 after serving two terms, apparently wants to leave office as the only Taiwanese leader who has made the most progress in improving ties with the mainland. In the last seven-and-a-half years, Ma restored the transportation links with the People’s Republic and expanded official exchanges. With a summit to wrap up his presidency, Ma would have an enviable legacy as a leader in pursuit of peace and reconciliation.

But this legacy is under threat. Ma’s approach to the mainland is losing support among Taiwanese voters, who will elect a new president and legislature in mid-January. Opinion polls show that the opposition party—the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which advocates formal independence from China—is poised to recapture the presidency and even win a majority in the legislature.

By holding a summit with Xi, Ma seems to believe that he will make it politically harder for a DPP president to dramatically reverse course. To be sure, the summit will only further antagonize the hardcore pro-independence cohort, but it will likely persuade moderates in Taiwan to support a policy of peace and reconciliation between the two nations.

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3. ANTI-CORRUPTION REGIME

The Anti-corruption campaign in China is a far-reaching campaign against corruption which began in China following the conclusion of the 18th National Congress (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/18th_National_Congress_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China) of the Communist Party of China (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_China). Held in November 2012, the 18th National Congress, saw the elevation of Xi Jinping (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xi_Jinping) to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Secretary_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China) and the formation of new Politburo (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politburo_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China) and Politburo Standing Committee (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politburo_Standing_Committee) (PSC). Both Xi and outgoing party General Secretary Hu Jintao (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hu_Jintao), emphasized corruption as a threat to the survival of the Chinese Communist Party.

Upon taking office, Xi vowed to crack down on "tigers and flies", that is, high-level officials and petty civil servants alike. The campaign's main targets are functionaries at all levels of the party apparatus and government bureaucracy. Most of the officials investigated were removed from office and faced accusations of bribery and abuse of power, although the range of alleged abuses varied widely. As of 2015, the campaign has 'netted' over 100 high-ranking officials, including about a dozen high-ranking military officers, several senior executives of state-owned companies, and four national leaders.[1] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-corruption_campaign_in_China#cite_note-99th-1) More than 100,000 people have been indicted for corruption, mostly politicians and officials. The campaign is part of a much wider drive to clean up malfeasance within party ranks and shore up party unity. It has become an emblematic feature of Xi Jinping's political brand.

Executed largely under the direction of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Commission_for_Discipline_Inspection) and its Secretary Wang Qishan (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wang_Qishan) along with corresponding military and judicial bodies, the corruption campaign was notable in implicating sitting and former national-level leaders, including former Politburo Standing Committee (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politburo_Standing_Committee) member Zhou Yongkang (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhou_Yongkang). Such investigations implicitly broke the unspoken rule regarding 'PSC criminal immunity' (Chinese (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_language): 刑不上常委) that has been the norm since the end of the Cultural Revolution (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural_Revolution).

The agency directly charged with overseeing the campaign is the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Commission_for_Discipline_Inspection) (CCDI), which, at the time of the campaign, was headed by Secretary Wang Qishan (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wang_Qishan), a politician known for his work in the financial sector and one of the seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politburo_Standing_Committee) of the Communist Party. Wang was in charge of the day-to-day execution of the campaign. The CCDI's official mandate is to enforce party discipline, combat malfeasance, and punish party members for committing offenses. The CCDI is an internal agency of the party and therefore does not have judicial authority. In general, the CCDI investigates officials and, when necessary, forwards evidence gathered to judicial organs, such as the Supreme People's Procuratorate (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_People%27s_Procuratorate) (in charge of investigation and prosecution), who proceeds to charge the accused with criminal wrongdoing and move the case to trial.

While the CCDI formally reports into the Party Congress, nominally the highest representative body of the party which gathers once every five years, and is intended to be an 'independent' agency from a constitutional standpoint, in practice ultimate oversight of the agency falls under the purview of Xi Jinping by virtue of his holding the office of General Secretary (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Secretary_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China). Xi, who is also President of the People's Republic of China (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/President_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China), also directs anti-graft efforts of the military through his holding the office of Chairman of the Central Military Commission (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chairman_of_the_Central_Military_Commission) (i.e., commander-in-chief). The majority of reporting on the campaign by media sources have highlighted Xi Jinping's direct involvement in managing the campaign, which has become a central hallmark of his term in office. However, formal disciplinary measures meted out to high-ranking officials such as former Politburo members must undergo ratification by the sitting Politburo.

Coordination of anti-corruption efforts in the provinces and state-owned enterprises have been carried out by "central inspection teams" (中央巡视组), which reports to the Central Leading Group for Inspection Work (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Leading_Group_for_Inspection_Work), which like the CCDI is also led by Wang Qishan (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wang_Qishan). The inspection teams are typically 'stationed' for a few months at the organization they were tasked with overseeing, and are in charge of thorough audits into the conduct of officials and organizational practices. The inspection teams sends the results of the audits to the CCDI to enact formal investigative procedures such as Shuanggui (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shuanggui)(the practice of detaining individual party members for investigation).

Chinese politics over the past two years can be summarized in two words: anti-corruption. It is said that 100,000 corrupt officials have already been caught, and public has been dizzied by the rapid tempo at which “big tigers” are falling. Right now, it’s common to see netizens joking: Wow, it’s been two weeks – why hasn’t the next minister fallen?

There’s no doubt that this administration has shown unprecedented determination to fight corruption, with similarly unprecedented scale and results. But as anti-corruption deepens and becomes the new normal, some questions remain unanswered, or are even getting more serious. For example, why is the government fighting corruption? When will a system for fighting corruption be built? Is there a roadmap for fighting corruption to the end?

The question of “why the government is fighting corruption” is the most important one, and some officials are paying special attention to this. Many times one official or another has privately asked me whether the anti-corruption drive is meant to get rid of dissidents and strengthen power. I thought so at the beginning, but now it appears that’s not entirely true. Whether continuing the campaign was a case of having a tiger by the tail and being unable to let go, or whether the government is following threads to get to an ultimate target doesn’t matter. Anti-corruption is now seen as the “way of things” and can’t be stopped without good reason.

It confused me that some officials looked downcast upon hearing me say this. But I soon understood – if anti-corruption aims to get rid of dissidents, then the campaign will come to an end after dissenters are eliminated. If, on the other hand, it’s actually aimed at cleaning up corruption, that’s different – there’s no turning back. The Chinese people hate the idea of anti-corruption as a power consolidation tool, and support true anti-corruption. But it’s precisely the other way around for some officials in power, who don’t fear “anti-corruption” as a disguise for eliminating enemies but do fear a real corruption clean-up.

This made me wonder – why is it that anti-corruption always gives people the impression that it aims at eliminating dissidents? I asked this question to a capable friend of mine in Beijing. He replied that to begin with, an anti-corruption campaign must start from dissidents – a doctor cannot treat himself, after all. “But by now, the anti-corruption campaign has already changed. Can you tell me what faction that fallen Supreme People’s Court vice president (http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/12/us-china-anticorruption-judge-idUSKCN0PM0K220150712) supposedly belonged to?”

I asked, “Then why doesn’t the government make that clear? Why give people the wrong impression? Even some domestic media outlets hinted at first that the ousted corrupt officials had chosen the wrong side.”

My friend laughed and explained that was the strategy. “You know how bad corruption is in China – if as soon as Xi took office he announced he wanted to thoroughly eliminate corruption, he would be destroyed by the corrupt. If from the very beginning he said he wanted a system to fight corruption, then the current powerful system would certainly pulverize him like a meat grinder. But when anti-corruption starts with dissidents, tracing enemies back to the source, there’s a clear path to follow – and it’s only later that anti-corruption begins to change without anyone realizing it.”

Is this too sophisticated of a strategy? Apparently, anti-corruption has to adopt the strategy of boiling a frog by very slowly increasing the temperature. At the beginning, you have to make every official believe that this wave of anti-corruption is not aiming at them, but at those who choose the wrong team. So we see every fallen “tiger,” just before he falls, standing on a stage yelling “Support anti-corruption!” How marvelous, how satisfying, and how ironic.

Think about it – if the holders of “the gun and the knife” (those in charge of China’s military and security apparatus) knew how they would end up one day, would anti-corruption have proceeded so smoothly? No matter how big of cowards they were, there would have been some backlash.

Maybe this explanation is just wishful thinking on the part of my friend. But if I were in Xi’s place, I probably wouldn’t have any alternative to that strategy. Corruption in China is already deeply rooted in every corner of politics, society, and culture – even worse, it’s become part of our lifestyle (http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/have-you-been-corrupt-today/). Under these circumstances, if you want to implement strong anti-corruption measures from top to bottom without causing a rebellion by corrupt officials or disappointing the public, you’ll need some special tactics.

Of course, having too sophisticated of a strategy is not always good either. It’s possible to have a strategy so subtle that people can’t understand it, and you can entrap yourself. In fact, that’s all too common. As long as corrupt officials are being caught, the public won’t be too offended by the tactics you use to wipe out corruption. But if there is no clear roadmap and you can’t effectively restrain corruption after a certain amount of time, or (worst of all) if new forms of corruption simply replace the old ways, that’s a big problem.

As for a roadmap for anti-corruption, Wang Qishan, the head of China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, has talked many times about the need for a temporary solution before a permanent cure. He means making officials “not dare to be corrupt,” then “not want to be corrupt,” and finally “not be able to be corrupt.” This roadmap seems clear enough, but out of all the people I’ve talked to, both in the government and not, almost no one believes that it’s possible.

As for me, I have put my hope in this roadmap, and become a target for criticism. Those outside the government think that I’m “hiding” within the system, while some corrupt officials who still hold power think that I’m the one who’s shaking up the system they depend on for corruption. I get attacked from all sides!

As a matter of fact, I have no special information channels and am not working for insiders. But my profound understanding of the situation both inside and outside of China’s system makes me believe that this is the last chance for the Chinese Communist Party to fight corruption, and it will make or break the CCP. And under those circumstances, I don’t believe there is anyone stupid enough to play politics and not really act.

The authorities definitely have a roadmap for fighting corruption. But when everyone doubts that this roadmap can be put into practice, then it truly does become impossible to implement the plan. In China, where corrupt and conservative forces are so powerful, the anti-corruption roadmap might share the fate of the roadmap for reform. Not only will it not be a guide for China’s path, but (on the contrary) it will become a target.

In this sense, it is the most profound strategy to work more and talk less, and move forward with deeply hidden intentions if necessary. But to succeed in that way takes an extremely strong person. Clearly, if we can’t place our hopes on the higher-ups, then we certainly can’t place them on a single person.

So finally, I want to emphasize that it doesn’t matter whether or not the authorities have a roadmap to fight corruption – what matters is whether or not we all have a roadmap in our hearts. If we all resolutely push China forward on the path toward clean governance, rule of law, freedom, democracy, equality, justice, and prosperity, and work toward this in all of our various fields, how can we not reach the goal?

The New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/world/asia/china-seeks-ling-wancheng-businessman-said-to-have-fled-to-us.html?_r=0) reports (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/world/asia/china-seeks-ling-wancheng-businessman-said-to-have-fled-to-us.html?_r=0) that Ling Wancheng, the brother of Ling Jihua, has apparently fled to the United States, and China badly wants him back. Ling Jihua was a top aide to former Chinese president Hu Jintao; he was ousted from the Chinese Communist Party in July after a corruption investigation. Even before Ling Jihua was officially expelled from the Party, there were rumors that his brother, businessman Ling Wancheng, had escaped Chinese authorities and traveled to the United States – bringing with him potentially damaging insider information on the CCP. The Times cited anonymous U.S. government officials as confirming as least part of these rumors: Ling is in the United States and China is pressuring Washington to deport him. As for whether he actually has a wealth of intelligence on current CCP leaders, the jury’s still out. But “the Chinese leadership would want this guy badly,” Christopher Johnson of CSIS told NYT.

The Los Angeles Times has its own story on Ling’s life in California (http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-corruption-ling-wancheng-html-20150806-htmlstory.html), where he went by the name Jason Wang. He was well-liked by his neighbors, who were shocked when Department of Homeland Security agents showed up asking about Ling and his wife. Ling’s current whereabouts are unknown.

Over at National Interest, Zachary Keck responds to reports (http://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/exposed-china-did-not-halt-island-building-project-the-south-13512) that China has stopped its land reclamation in the South China Sea. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in Kuala Lumpur for a series of ASEAN meetings, told reporters (http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/05/us-asean-malaysia-idUSKCN0QA05U20150805) that “China has already stopped [reclamation work]. You just take an airplane to take a look.” As Keck points out, however, China stopped the work not out of concerns for rising tensions, but simply because the reclamation phase is completed. “The next phase of the operation is to complete construction of military and civilian facilities on the newly-created islands,” Keck says, and there’s no indication Beijing will pause those activities.

Also on the South China Sea, the Asan Forum has an article by Scott Bentley (http://www.theasanforum.org/malaysias-special-relationship-with-china-and-the-south-china-sea-not-so-special-anymore/) outlining the Malaysia’s role in the disputes. Malaysia has been one of the quietest claimants, apparently hoping that behind-the-scenes diplomacy will be more successful in getting Beijing’s attention. According to Bentley, who traces moves by Chinese coast guard vessels on Malaysian-claimed features, that strategy isn’t working.

For a look at how important China’s claim to features near Malaysia (such as James Shoal, Zengmu Ansha in Chinese) are in China’s nationalist discourse, check out this August 2014 piece (http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/the-nine-dashed-line-engraved-in-our-hearts/) from Zheng Wang. From the article:

Since the 1940s, generations of Chinese have learned from their geography textbooks that Zengmu Ansha is the southernmost point of China’s territory. Different generations of Chinese have also conducted a similar exercise in their middle school geography classes: the students use a ruler to measure the distance from the northernmost point of China (Mohe, near the Amur River, at the latitude of 53° 29′ north) to Zengmu Ansha (at the latitude of 4° 15′ north) and then feel very proud of their country’s vast territory.

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4. RISING TENSIONS WITH JAPAN

Finally, this has definite ramifications for China-Japan relations: an advisory panel in Japan, tasked by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe with analyzing historical issues and what steps Japan can take to advance reconciliation has issued its report. Japan Times has a summary (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/06/national/politics-diplomacy/abe-advisory-panel-cites-wartime-aggression-fails-address-recent-revisionism/#.VcTDiPlWzX7); the full 49-page report (http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/21c_koso/pdf/report_en.pdf) is also online.

One interesting nugget symbolizes the various perspectives at play: the report uses the word “aggression” to describe Japan’s actions “against the [Asian] continent,” but includes a lengthy footnote describing some panel members’ objections to the use of the term.

When Abe used the word “aggression” in his August 15th statement, he was closely watched by China...

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5. PRESIDENT XI LEADERSHIP AND INTERNATIONAL POWER LEGACY -- President Xi's foreign policy may cause consternation amongst China's neighbors, and his foreign and economic policies upset the apple carts of most world powers -- but by 2020 President Xi will probably be the world's most powerful figure leading the world's most powerful nation, looking to expand its sphere of dominance to its historical limits if not beyond...

If he can achieve these awesome goals without much bloodshed and mange to gain his global power without war -- then President Xi would be placed n the annals of history way high much like Theodore Roosevelt and few other gutsy and great Leaders...

And it all rests on flooding the world with a powerful new Reserve Currency to be accepted by all and sundry.

The Reminbi...

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So for all these reasons please join us to gain valuable Insights on this future as it's written right here in front of our own eyes...

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