History of Philosophy Book Club

Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) stands as one of the great dissenters from the Cartesian worldview that dominated eighteenth-century Europe, and as one of the first sociologists and philosophers of history and class struggle. While Descartes and his followers sought to extend the geometric method to all domains of knowledge, Vico insisted that human affairs require a fundamentally different approach. He grounded this approach not in mathematical certainty but in rhetoric, imagination, and historical understanding.

Vico spent most of his life in Naples, working as a professor of rhetoric. From this position, he watched Cartesian science sweep the academies, displacing the ancient humanistic traditions he cherished. His early works defended the value of rhetoric and imagination against those who saw clarity and distinctness as the sole criteria of knowledge. Vico was developing the idea that cultivated imagination is its own, independently valid way of knowing. But his mature philosophy went further, expanding his concept of imaginative or poetic knowing into a comprehensive science of history that has been seen as fundamentally at odds with the Enlightenment project.

At the heart of Vico's thought lies the verum-factum principle: we can truly know only what we ourselves have made. Since God made the natural world, only God can fully comprehend it. But the civil world—the world of laws, customs, languages, and institutions—is a human creation, and therefore deeply knowable by human minds. This insight reverses the effect of the mathematical philosophy, which had seemed to make physics knowable and human affairs unaccountable.

In his great work, the New Science, Vico develops his insight into a comprehensive philosophy of history. He argues that all nations pass through an ideal eternal history—a cycle of three ages (gods, heroes, and humans) driven not by rational deliberation but by providence working through human passions and necessities. The earliest humans, Vico claims, did not think in concepts but in what he calls "imaginative universals"—mythic figures like Jove and Juno that organized experience through poetry and ritual rather than analysis. Understanding this "poetic wisdom" requires overcoming what Vico calls the "conceit of scholars": our tendency to assume that ancient peoples thought as we do or did not think at all.

** NOTE--We are meeting 1 hour earlier than usual because of room availability. We will start at noon instead of 1 pm. **

Life
Charles Louis de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, was born in 1689 near Bordeaux, France to a noble and wealthy family. He trained as a lawyer at the University of Bordeaux. Through marriage and inheritance of a position in the Parlement of Bordeaux, he was financially secure before 30 and had time to read and write, in addition to his duties at Parlement. His first successful book was Persian Letters, an epistolary novel published anonymously in 1721 that satirizes French society from the point of view of two wealthy Persians. He then sought to turn his literary success into social success at court, salons, and the French Academy. In 1728, he took the grand tour; over the course of several years, he visited Vienna, Hungary, Venice, Florence, Rome, and England, where he became a fellow of the Royal Society. His next major work, published in 1734, was Considerations on the Causes of Romans’ Greatness and Decline. In 1748, he published his most famous work, one that he claims took him twenty years and that was to greatly influence the American Founders: the Spirit of the Laws. He died in 1755.

Themes
The influence of the Spirit of the Laws on the Founding generation that crafted the U.S. Constitution has secured for Montesquieu enduring relevance for those who want to understand the Founding Era and the Constitution. In this sprawling work, Montesquieu divides the types of government into republics, monarchies, and despotisms, each of which has its animating principle (virtue, honor, and fear). This contrasts with Aristotle’s categorization of polity, aristocracy, and monarchy, each of which has a corrupted form, democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny, respectively. Montesquieu argued that liberty can be best protected by the separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, which finds expression in the three branches of the U.S. government. Among many other notable ideas in this work, he argued that laws should be crafted to accord with a people’s religion, climate, habits, wealth, and other social and economic factors. Against earlier natural law theorists, such as Grotius and Pufendorf, he argued that war did not justify slavery.

In the prior century, Pascal had made a name for himself in taking on the Jesuits in his Provincial Letters. Several decades later in Persian Letters, Montesquieu used a similar rhetorical setup to satirize Parisan and French life, including religion, social practices, and the monarchy of Louis XIV from the perspective of two Persian travelers, Uzbek and Rica. The Letters show Montesquieu’s willingness to at least somewhat relativize European practices, if only to make points consistent with his own social and political class.

In the Considerations, Montesquieu takes up a theme that would later make Edward Gibbon famous. One of his arguments in this work is that the maxims that made Rome an empire out of a republic were inadequate to keep the empire. He also argued that chance doesn’t rule events; there are underlying causes that can be discovered.