Will "Something Akin to Panpsychism" Lead to a Solution of the Mind-Body Problem

In a somewhat seminal paper in 2006 Galen Strawson claims that "...something akin to panpsychism" is the "...only possible form of physicalism tout court." He goes on to explain why.
Elsewhere the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy claims that " ...: either you are a panpsychist, or you are an emergentist. Either mind was present in things from the very beginning or it appeared (emerged) at some point in the history of evolution."

But is Strawson right? And if wrong, is the IEP right and we are all FORCED to be 'emergentists'?

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From Strawson 2006: Realistic Monism:

"...I do not, however, think that I need these assumptions in order to show that something akin to panpsychism is not merely one possible form of realistic physicalism, real physicalism, but the only possible form, and, hence, the only possible form of physicalism tout court."

Link to Strawsons 2006 article:

https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=Realistic%20monism%20-%20why%20physicalism%20entails%20panpsychism+author%3AStrawson#d=gs_qabs&u=%23p%3Du082hSzYCZsJ

And...

From Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
Panpsychism;

4. Panpsychism vs. Emergentism
   The issue of emergence of mind is important because it is the mutually exclusive counterpart to panpsychism: either you are a panpsychist, or you are an emergentist. Either mind was present in things from the very beginning or it appeared (emerged) at some point in the history of evolution. If, however, emergence is inexplicable, or is less viable, then one is left with the panpsychist alternative. This line of reasoning, as mentioned above, is the argument from Non-Emergence.

Here's the link to the IEP article:

https://iep.utm.edu/panpsych/#H4

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Also Colin McGinn has begun to criticise Strawson This way:

Hard Questions: Comments on Galen Strawson

January 2006

Journal of Consciousness Studies 13(10-11):90-99

Authors:

Colin McGinn
Abstract

"I find myself in agreement with almost all of Galen's paper (Strawson, 2006) -- except, that is, for his three main claims. These I take to be: that he has provided a substantive and useful definition of 'physicalism'; that physicalism entails panpsychism; and that panpsychism is a necessary and viable doctrine. But I find much to applaud in the incidentals Galen brings in to defend these three claims, particularly his eloquent and uncompromising rejection of the idea of brute emergence, as well as his dissatisfaction with standard forms of physicalism. I certainly find his paper far more on target than most of the stuff I read on this topic."
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The Combination Problem:

There are problems for panpsychism, of course, perhaps the most important being the combination problem. Panpsychists hold that consciousness emerges from the combination of billions of subatomic consciousnesses, just as the brain emerges from the organisation of billions of subatomic particles. But how do these tiny consciousnesses combine? We understand how particles combine to make atoms, molecules and larger structures, but what parallel story can we tell on the phenomenal side? How do the micro-experiences of billions of subatomic particles in my brain combine to form the twinge of pain I’m feeling in my knee? If billions of humans organised themselves to form a giant brain, each person simulating a single neuron and sending signals to the others using mobile phones, it seems unlikely that their consciousnesses would merge to form a single giant consciousness. Why should something similar happen with subatomic particles?

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Searle on Panpsychism: not even false

"The problem with panpsychism is not that it is false; it does not get up to the level of being false. It is strictly speaking meaningless because no clear notion has been given to the claim. Consciousness comes in units and panpsychism cannot specify the units." John Searle, NYRB, 10 January, 2013, 55, reviewing Christof Koch, Consciousness: Confessions of A Romatic Reductionist.

So, take that, Mr. Spinoza!