Bi-Weekly "Metapolitics" Discussion in Fishtown

Details

Due to the crowdedness & noise levels at the Front Street Café & recent problems with our reservations, I've decided to move our discussion venue around the corner to Frankford Hall, which is near the corner of Frankford & Girard Streets. Luckily, this is still a very accessible location. SEPTA's Girard Station is just a block south, and there's also usually spaces available for street parking in the surrounding neighborhood. If you can't find a spot on the street, there's a paid parking lot called "Park America" a half-block north at 1320 N. Front Street.

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THE DEBATE OVER SCIENTISM, NAIVE UTILITARIANISM AND TECHNOCRACY:

This discussion will serve as an introduction to some of the basic issues that underlie the debate among intellectuals & scientists over "scientism" - i.e. the idea that the scientific method is universally applicable and can potentially solve all of humanity's questions & problems. Over the past decade or so, this view has been embraced by a diverse group of including many luminaries in the skeptic & "New Atheist" movements like Sam Harris, Michael Shermer, Steven Pinker, and Lawrence Krauss have all argued for a science of morality. Sam Harris, along with thinkers like David Pearce, Joshua Green and Richard Layard have argued that that this science of morality should be based on neuroscience, since it allows us to identify human mental states that qualify as "flourishing". (This view has been called "neuroscientism" by its critics.)

Once we accept that human flourishing is a worthwhile goal, Harris and the others argue that that the logical conclusion is that we should maximize this state in as much of the human (and possibly animal) population as possible. This has lead them to argue that empirical science mandates that we adopt a form of "utilitarianism" as a moral & political philosophy. However, this has led to some pushback from other philosophers & intellectuals who don't think science can overcome the "fact-value distinction" (a.k.a. "is-ought problem"), as well as people uncomfortable with some of the policy proposals of prominent utilitarians like Peter Singer which include eugenics, euthanasia, infanticide & healthcare rationing that discriminates against the disabled.

The "scientism" debate is also related to the idea that humanity would be better off if we abandoned democracy in favor of "technocracy" - i.e. a system of governance where decision-makers are selected on the basis of scientific & technical knowledge. Unlike the technocratic movements of the early 20th century that often explicitly renounced liberal democracy and advocated totalitarianism, most of the current advocates like Venkatesh Rao and Parag Khanna have essentially just argued for social democracy with an expanded civil service bureaucracy, although Rao argues for a full-scale WWII-style economic mobilization to fight anthropogenic global warming.

Technocrats argue that we should design policy based on the weight of scientific evidence - something Neil DeGrasse Tyson advocated recently. This runs into the problem of the fact-value distinction again, since policies can be circumscribed by positive facts about the natural world, but it's impossible to make policy without including normative elements (i.e. moral values) as well. Another problem is the "underdetermination of theory by the evidence" - i.e. the evidence available to us at a given time may be insufficient to determine what positive beliefs we should hold in response to it, since multiple theories may explain the same data set. This also occurs with value-laden policies -- even in cases where two people adhere to the same moral philosophy (like utilitarianism), the evidence can lead them even the most rational people to prefer different policies based on the evidence. We'll explore this problem in relation to a tweet Neil DeGrasse Tyson made about the statistics on gun violence and the implications of this for gun control.

NOTE: The scientism/technocracy debate can be considered part of the larger debate over the relationship between science and philosophy that has been raging over the last decade or so. The "Skeptics in the Pub" meetup will be holding a group discussion immediately following ours that delves into some of the issues our meetup doesn't cover. Check out their outline here: https://www.meetup.com/Philly-Skeptics/events/237565657/
WHAT TO READ: There's a lot to read this week, but if you're pressed for time just watch Sam Harris's TED Talk, watch Joshua Greene's 2 short videos about Utilitarianism, read Neil DeGrasse Tyson's facebook post on Rationalia, and read the short article by Massimo Pigliucci on the limits of rational discourse. The critiques of Harris & Tyson's arguments, along with the supplemental material I've listed on utilitarian philosophy & psychology, will be explained during the course of our discussion.

CAN SCIENCE BRIDGE THE "FACT-VALUE DISTINCTION" AND DISCOVER A SINGLE SET OF EMPIRICALLY CORRECT MORAL VALUES FOR HUMAN SOCIETIES? IF SCIENCE CAN'T IDENTIFY THE BEST SET OF MORAL VALUES, CAN IT AT LEAST NARROW DOWN OUR OPTIONS?

Sam Harris, "Science Can Answer Moral Questions" (23:06 minutes)

https://www.ted.com/talks/sam_harris_science_can_show_what_s_right

Massimo Pigliucci, "About Sam Harris’ claim that science can answer moral questions" (article)

http://rationallyspeaking.blogspot.com/2010/04/about-sam-harris-claim-that-science-can.html

WHAT FURTHER DETERMINATIONS BEYOND "MAXIMIZE FLOURISHING" WOULD WE NEED TO FORM A SYSTEM OF ETHICS BASED ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE? WHY DO THE POLITICAL VIEWS OF UTILITARIAN SCIENTISTS APPEAR TO RANGE FROM LIBERTARIANISM (MICHAEL SHERMER) TO AN ADMIRATION FOR NOAM CHOMSKY'S DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM (LAWRENCE KRAUSS)?

Joshua Greene, "Utilitarianism and Moral Progress" (4:53 minutes)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y6q49Bh1-yo

Joshua Greene & Russ Roberts, "Econtalk: Moral Tribes, Moral Dilemmas, and Utilitarianism" (3:45 minutes)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7jCpcnbaEsw

There are many variations on utilitarian philosophy that have emerged over the past two centuries, and depending on which types you choose you can end up at anything from totalitarian, collectivist ideologies like fascism & communism to more individualist, liberal ideologies like Rawlsian social democracy & the Chomskyan "democratic socialism" variants as well as "bleeding heart" libertarianism (i.e. libertarianism with social justice elements). The utilitarian scientists appear to all favor the more liberal versions of utilitarian political systems, but their lack of interest in philosophy appears to prevent them from being able to clearly articulate why they favor one specific political system based on utility. In many cases, they don't even identify as "utilitarian" despite making many utilitarian-sounding arguments - philosophers often refer to this as "naïve utilitarianism". Two other problems, as Joshua Greene alluded to in his talk with Russ Roberts, are "motivated reasoning" and a tendency for even utilitarians to default to certain axiomatic "rights" rather than asking whether an action will have good or bad effects.

Note: To help illustrate the problems that still await a moral philosopher even after embracing the fundamental premise of utilitarianism, I've posed a series of questions below. Beneath each question is the terms used to describe it in utilitarian philosophy. I don't expect those who don't have deep interest in philosophy to read all of these links and understand the nuances of utilitarianism, but if you're interested I've provided some links below that can help. You may also want to look at the discussion notes from our previous meetup on "Effective Altruism" since it's a practical application of utilitarianism & it faces many of the same philosophical dilemmas: https://www.meetup.com/Philadelphia-Political-Agnostics/events/234126865/

(1) Should our actions be judged by their effects, their adherence to a rule designed to typically have good effects, or some mixture of the two? Should our intention to produce good effects carry some moral weight, even in spite of unforeseen consequences that are bad?

Act vs. Rule Utilitarianism; Two-Step Utilitarianism & Motive Utilitarianism

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Two-level_utilitarianism

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism#Motive_utilitarianism

(2) Is there a moral difference between killing someone and letting them die? In the Trolley Problem, are pulling the switch and pushing the Fat Man off the bridge morally equivalent, since both kill one person to save five people? Is it moral for a doctor to kill an innocent person and harvest their organs to save five people in need of transplants?

Acts vs. Omissions Doctrine

http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095349153

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem

(3) Provided we could somehow quantify the total happiness of a nation's populace into something like "Gross National Happiness" (GNH), should we strive to maximize GNH or GNH per capita?

Average vs. Median vs. Total Utilitarianism

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Average_and_total_utilitarianism

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gross_National_Happiness

(4) Is "total utility" equivalent to the power or production or "cultural flourishing" of the community or nation-state?

State Consequentialism vs. Person-Affecting View

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_consequentialism

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Person-affecting_view

(5) Is it more important to promote happiness or reducing suffering?

Positive vs. Negative Utilitarianism

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negative_utilitarianism

(6) Are there "higher" and "lower" pleasures? Is J.S. Mill right that it's better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied? Does it matter if a person's pleasure is "real" or if they're plugged into a virtual reality simulator like Robert Nozick's "pleasure machine"? Can we solve these questions by simply allowing each individual to enact their own preferences?

Ideal vs. Hedonistic Utilitarianism; Value Monism vs. Value Pluralism & Preference Utilitarianism

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarianism#Ideal_utilitarianism

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_pluralism

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Preference_utilitarianism

(7) Who should be included in our moral community - some humans, all humans, all humans & some of the "higher" animals, or all sentient life? Should our moral circle have gradations - e.g. should family members be more important than strangers, or our fellow countrymen be more important than foreigners? Does allowing intolerant, non-utilitarian people into the moral community create a "paradox of tolerance"? If animal suffering is important, is allowing carnivores to continue to kill & eat herbivores also a "paradox of tolerance"?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentiocentrism

https://moralmusings21.wordpress.com/2010/12/10/reciprocity-and-moral-proximity/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_tolerance

(8) Is there a duty to reproduce? Should the potential utility of future generations count for those who are alive today? If so, do we have a moral duty to minimize the debt that gets passed on to future generations, to avoid long-term pollution & resource depletion, and to spend money to avert existential risk (i.e. human extinction)? Could the currently high levels of greenhouse gas emissions be justified if we reasonably expect that they are inseparable from economic growth, and that the future wealth produced by this growth will more than counterbalance the climate problems for future generations?

Population Ethics & Intergenerational Equity

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_ethics

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_catastrophic_risk#Moral_importance_of_existential_risk

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intergenerational_equity

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_population_planning#Views_on_population_planning

(9) If we try to maximize total utility by expanding the population, won't we end up with an overpopulated future society where the average utility of each citizen is just barely positive (i.e. their lives are just barely worth living)?

Mere Addition Paradox

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mere_addition_paradox

(10) Should we focus on an equal distribution of wealth or on economic growth, since "growing the pie" via creating new businesses & promoting technological development could enable a higher level of total wealth that could be redistributed later? Do we wait for the "rising tide" to "raise all ships"?

Equity vs. Efficiency Tradeoff

http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/equityefficiencytradeoff.asp

(11) Should economic distribution focus on making people equal or just making sure everyone has enough? Would the majority in a prioritarian society be harmed by redistribution to a minority of people who are always behind and require massive inputs of resources just to sustain them?

Prioritarianism vs. Sufficientarianism; Priority View vs. Equal Weight View; Priority Monster

http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2011/03/getting-clearer-about-social-justice/

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prioritarianism

http://bioethics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/16354/Pummer-ThePriorityMonsterAbstract.pdf

(12) If a rich person somehow has higher utility for a sum of money than a poor person, could they claim priority in the distribution of resources? Imagine that the rich person is an aesthete with very refined taste, whereas the poor person is a boor who will waste the money on alcohol & gambling. Or what if the rich person's utility is connected to the future utility of the rest of society - e.g. they're conducting medical research that could save millions of lives, or they're creating a great work of art that will bring joy to millions?

Utility Monster

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utility_monster

(13) Should we allot goods to people based on their expected utility instead of ability to pay or "first come, first served"? Should the elderly be allotted less because their life expectancy is shorter, and thus their expected utility is less? Should the disabled be allotted less because it's much more expensive to raise their utility? Should medical care be alloted based on the chances a person will survive, since if they die their utility is gone?

Rationing & Triage

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rationing

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triage

(14) Should we increase total/average utility by breeding high utility people or preventing the birth of low utility people? Do people have a moral obligation to avoid pregnancy if their child would probably have negative utility (e.g. genetic disorders that would create severe disabilities)? Does this moral obligation extend to aborting a fetus that exhibits genetic defects? Should the utility of a fetus be judged from the point of view of the fetus, the mother, or the rest of society?

Positive vs. Negative Eugenics; Voluntary vs. Involuntary Abortion & Sterilization

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eugenics

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Compulsory_sterilization

(15) Should we increase the total or average utility of society by using assisted suicide of people with low utility? Does their consent matter? Does killing someone instantly & painlessly affect their utility, or does it simply remove them from the equation?

Voluntary vs. Involuntary vs. Non-voluntary Euthanasia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-voluntary_euthanasia

WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF SCIENTISTS & UTILITARIANS? SINCE MOST UTILITARIAN SCIENTISTS APPEAR TO BE ATHEISTS, HOW DOES THIS MATCH UP WITH THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF ATHEISTS? IS THERE ANY TRUTH TO THE ALLEGATIONS THAT UTILITARIANS AND ATHEISTS ARE "AUTISTIC" OR "PSYCHOPATHS"?

I've included some articles in the Discussions tab that deal with the common psychological traits of scientists, utilitarians & atheists which appear to overlap in some interesting ways. For those of you who remember our earlier discussion on Effective Altruism, scientists, utilitarians & atheists seem to share the psychological traits that Geoffrey Miller outlined for effective altruists - i.e. high IQ, high Openness, low Agreeableness, and a cognitive style inclined towards Systematizing over Empathizing.

Unsurprisingly, scientists can be distinguished from the rest of the population by their Intellectual Quotient (IQ). For example, PhD physicists have an average IQ of 140, almost three standard deviations above the mean of the population. However, the ability of IQ tests to determine cognitive capacities is controversial, and most cognitive tasks are achieved at similar rates by individuals with IQs over 120, regardless of their precise IQ score. Overall, high intelligence would appear to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition for scientific thought and interest.
Scientists are on average about half a standard deviation higher in Conscientiousness than non-scientists. Conscientiousness implies a desire to do a task well, and conscientious people tend to be more efficient & organized, hard-working & reliable. They are also more likely to be conformists & workaholics. Politically, conscientiousness has a weak positive relationship with conservative political attitudes and a stronger correlation with authoritarianism. In the Milgram experiment, conscientiousness was associated with willingness to administer high-intensity electric shocks to a victim.
Although scientists show higher levels of Openness than non-scientists, the larger difference lies within the scientific community, with "creative scientists" scoring a third of a standard deviation higher on openness than less creative scientists. (Creativity in scientists appears to be predicted by precocious mathematical ability, musical ability & visualization ability.) Scientists tend to score high in one of the six facets of Openness, intellectual curiosity, which is related to another personality variable - the Need For Cognition (NFC) which is an important predictor of interest in science. NFC can be defined as “an individual’s tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavours." NFC and Openness have somewhat contrasting correlation patterns with other personality traits. For example, NFC was more strongly correlated with emotional stability and activity than Openness, whereas Openness was more strongly correlated with novelty & experience-seeking than NFC.
Scientists are more solitary and independent than non-scientists, though this is more the case for physical scientists & mathematicians than social scientists. For example, research points out to a predisposition for Asperger’s syndrome in science, math and engineering, a syndrome involving impaired social interest and stereotyped behaviours. A particularly interesting point is the tendency for scientists being less social and affiliative than non-scientists, despite networking and collaborating being an integral part of a scientist’s life.
Biographers of Jeremy Bentham, the founder of Utilitarianism, have hypothesized that his strikingly unusual cast of mind can be best understood as emerging from Asperger’s syndrome (AS). By rendering him incapable of sharing so many of his contemporaries’ common-sense assumptions, AS may have enabled Bentham to continue articulating, with extraordinary persistence, Enlightenment critiques of the status quo in various domains, pushing them to what he saw as their logical conclusions. Bentham’s work in clarifying & codifying the vast areas of jurisprudence, ethics, political theory, welfare and social administration and, particularly, language, can be seen as being motivated by the typical AS sufferer's efforts to find security and to manage uncertainty.
Neuoscientists have used fMRI to scan the brains of subjects pondering the ethical dilemmas in Trolley Problem. They've found that in most people, in the lever scenario, much activity is evident in the areas of the brain that are in charge of rational thinking & executive functioning; but when you are asked to contemplate personally pushing someone to their death then the emotional centers of the brain light up and they refuse to do it. However, there is a minority of people who always make the “utilitarian” decision: they pull the lever, but also push the fat man. These "utilitarian" subjects show lower levels of empathic concern and are more likely to have the psychological characteristics of sub-clinical psychopathy.
In follow-up studies, researchers asked participants a number of additional questions having to do with their overall ethical outlook. Subjects that would push the fat man in the Trolley Problem showed greater endorsement of rational egoism, less donation of money to a charity, and less identification with the whole of humanity, a core feature of classical utilitarianism. They also tended to endorse a broadly immoral outlook concerning clear ethical transgressions in a business context. The researchers found no association between "utilitarian" judgments in sacrificial dilemmas and characteristic utilitarian judgments relating to assistance to distant people in need, self-sacrifice and impartiality, even when the utilitarian justification for these judgments was made explicit & unequivocal. This evidence suggests that the “utilitarians” who would push the fat man in the Trolley Problem are no such thing, and that they rather fit the profile of rational egoists, which in turn is more logically associated with sub-clinical psychopathy.
According to another recent study, when autistic people are placed in hypothetical moral dilemma situations, they show an empathic response similar to the general population. The myth of emotional coldness in autism is likely due to the presence of the subclinical trait of "alexithymia" which is often associated with autism, but is distinct and can be present in the general population, and is characterized by the inability to recognize one's own, or others' emotions. The results revealed that alexithymia is related to utilitarian choices on account of reduced empathic concern, while the autistic trait is linked to opposition to utilitarian choices due to increased personal distress.
Research comparing the personalities of religious and non-religious people has found that atheism is generally linked to higher Openness but lower Agreeableness and lower Conscientiousness, and vice-versa for religious people. However, there are important cultural differences. In countries where religious belief is less common than in the U.S., non-religious people do not appear to be as low in Agreeableness & Conscientiousness as those in the U.S., nor as high in Openness. Essentially, atheists in the U.S. tend to rebels & non-conformists, whereas in more secular countries this is less the case, and in fact the religious people are the non-conformists. (The study didn't address this, but scientific fields in the U.S. may be more comparable to living in Europe, where it's socially easier to declare oneself an atheist and thus atheist scientists may be less disagreeable & less open-minded than atheists in the rest of American society.)
Pew data reveal that, compared to the general population of the United States, American atheists tend to be white, college educated, and politically liberal. Among Americans, 68% of atheists are men, which is consistent with the rest of research into the psychology of religion. Women are more likely to self-identify as religious and participate in religious activities. Women also feel more certain about their belief in God and pray more frequently.
A number of studies link thinking style to religious belief and disbelief. Believers are more likely to be intuitive thinkers. They feel more comfortable trusting their gut-level feelings. Atheists are more likely to be analytical thinkers.
Research on Theory of Mind – our ability to think about the mental lives of others – suggests that people who are more inclined to anticipate and think about the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of others are also more likely to be religious. The basic idea is that it requires this kind of mental perspective-taking to imagine a God or other spirits. People who score higher on empathizing and emotional perspective-taking measures tend to be more religious. Women also score higher on empathizing and emotional perspective-taking and tend to be more sensitive to the mental states of others, and this appears to contribute to their religious proclivities.
Autistic people are more likely to be atheist than non-autistic individuals, and one characteristic of autism is low Theory of Mind. Autistic individuals struggle with imagining the internal states of others, and this may also make it more challenging for them to imagine the existence of a God with thoughts and intentions. Despite these cognitive differences, atheists are not disadvantaged in terms of their morality and ethics. There is no evidence that they are more prone to antisocial behavior or criminality. Surveys indicate that as a group, atheists tend to be against war, the death penalty, and torture and commit very few crimes.
The popular science media recently reported that "religious people are less smart but atheists are psychopaths," but this is an exaggeration & gross simplification of the research. Researchers did find that nonreligious participants scored higher on “psychopathy,” but it’s important to note that “psychopathy” is a technical term for assessing moral concern not analogous to the popular conception of the criminally insane. “Psychopathy” was measured through series of self-reported questions including how strongly you agree with the statement: “I would describe myself as a pretty softhearted person.” Furthermore, research has shown that theists & atheists don't differ in their intuitive preferences for justice & compassion. However, theists & atheists do have some differences with their approach to moral questions, which may explain the some of the effect found in this study. Speaking of effects, the authors even admit that the effect size for the relationship they found was quite small, so while the relationship may have been statistically significant, it’s not incredibly meaningful. (The sensationalized reporting of this story also made theists look bad. Yes, the study did find a negative relationship between their measures of intelligence and religiosity. However, “intelligence” was measured by a vocabulary test and a few brainteaser questions and the effect size was also rather small.)

CAN SCIENCE ALLOW US TO DEDUCE THE MOST EFFECTIVE PUBLIC POLICIES FROM THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE? TO WHAT EXTENT DO CHAOTIC & NON-LINEAR PHENOMENA CREATE AN "EPISTEMIC HORIZON" THAT PLACES ON LIMITS ON THE ABILITIES OF TECHNOCRATS?

Neil DeGrasse Tyson, "Reflections on Rationalia" (article)

https://www.facebook.com/notes/neil-degrasse-tyson/reflections-on-rationalia/10154399608556613/

Kevin D. Williamson, "The Road to Rationalia" (article)

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/437324/neil-degrasse-tysons-rationality-pipe-dream

CAN TWO UTILITARIANS DISAGREE ON THE BEST POLICY EVEN IF THEY AGREE ON THE EVIDENCE & BOTH ARE RATIONAL? IF SO, WHY CAN'T THE EVIDENCE ALWAYS DETERMINE THE CORRECT SOLUTION -- OR EVEN WHETHER A PARTICULAR PROBLEM IS "IMPORTANT"?