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This is going to be an online meetup using Zoom. If you've never used Zoom before, don't worry — it's easy to use and free to join.

Click on the link below at the schedule date/time...

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THE UKRAINE WAR AT 2 YEARS

INTRODUCTION:

In this meetup, we'll look at what's happened in the Russo-Ukrainian War since the invasion began a little over 2 years ago on Feb. 24, 2023 and try to predict what the most likely outcomes of this war are in the coming year, while keeping in mind the various unknowns and contingent factors. We'll also discuss how the war reports we hear in the news media and the predictions about what will happen are shaped by competing political ideologies. Much of the news media analysis suffers from what H.R. McMaster has called "strategic narcissism" - i.e. "our tendency to view the world only in relation to us, and then to assume that what the United States does, is decisive to achieving a favorable outcome.” In this discussion, we'll do our best to avoid this sort of narcissistic bias that tries to turn the Ukrainian War into a "morality play" tied to America's culture war, and we'll try to cultivate "strategic empathy" which McMaster defines as an understanding of "the agency, the influence, the authorship over the future that others have and, in particular... the ideology and the emotions and the aspirations that drive and constrain the other, especially rivals, adversaries and enemies.” (Note: We'll also try to remember the "fact-value distinction" and separate what we think *will* happen from what we *want* to happen.)

In the 1st section, we'll look at some arguments from pundits & analysts who think that Russia will probably win the conflict and ultimately conquer much of Ukraine. In Feb. 2022, many experts like Gen. Mark Milley were initially worried that Kyiv would fall within days if Russia invaded. But after the invasion stalled and Ukraine rapidly retook its northern territories, this pessimistic view quickly faded. From then on through the spring of 2023, it was only held by a few establishment outsiders like the former USMC intelligence officer Scott Ritter, former CIA analyst Ray McGovern, and retired US Army Col. Douglas MacGreggor, as well as some conservative pundits (e.g. Tucker Carlson) who were admirers of Putin. However, this pessimistic view has been more recently expressed by the respected ecologist-cum-forecaster Peter Turchin who thinks Russia's 3-to-1 military manpower advantage and the "attrition warfare model" spells doom for Ukraine.

In the 2nd section, we'll look at some arguments from pundits & analysts who think that Ukraine will probably win the conflict and ultimately retake the Donbas region and Crimea. Last spring, this optimistic view was held by some well-respected analysts like US Ambassador to NATO Kurt Volker, the economist Paul Krugman, as well as US military leaders like Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges and Gen. Wesley Clark. The latter two predicted that Ukrainian forces would reconquer Crimea by August 2023, despite the extreme difficulty of a land invasion across the Isthmus of Perekop or a D-Day-style amphibious landing. Krugman's reasoning - i.e Ukraine's Western support gave it a 20-fold differential in military spending over Russia - along with Ukraine's victories in Kherson & the Kharkiv oblast in Sept. 2022 seemed to offer support for this view. However after the Ukrainian advance stalled last summer and Russia made gains around Bakhmut, that highly optimistic view appears to be less common. This spring, some fear we could see more trouble for Ukraine, particularly after recent Russian advances around Avdiivka and the uncertain outcome of the Nov. 2024 presidential election, which could see Trump return to power and cut funding for Ukraine.

In the 3rd section, we'll look at some arguments from pundits & analysts who think that we'll continue to see a "frozen conflict" where the inability of either side to break through opposing lines produces a virtual stalemate, with territory shifting only slightly even as casualties on both sides pile up. Last spring, the political scientist Stephen Walt appeared to hold this view, as did Gen. Mark Milley and the military analyst Michael Kofman - although the latter two just predicted a long war and didn't see the situation quite as pessimistically as Walt, who's a long-time critic of the "liberal international order". This spring, the tendency to view the war as a slow-moving war of attrition roughly akin to WW1 or the Iran-Iraq War appears to be gaining ground among mainstream foreign policy experts, although many also hope that Ukraine can win a long-running war if Western military aid continues.

In the 4th section, we'll look at some arguments from pundits & analysts who fear that NATO & Russian forces will come into direct conflict, possibly resulting in Russia using a nuclear strike on Ukraine or over the North Atlantic as a warning, a strategy known as "escalating to de-escalate." If this happened, the US could retaliate in a way that would escalate tensions further, leading to a full-scale nuclear war. Other experts predicted Putin might "gamble for resurrection" if he thought a loss in Ukraine would destabilize his regime, and this could also lead him to use a tactical nuclear weapon. Last spring, these sort of alarmist views were voiced by the IR scholars John Mearsheimer & Hein Goemans, as well as the physicist Max Tegmark - with the latter predicting a 1-in-6 chance of global nuclear war. This spring, the fears of imminent nuclear war seem to have abated, although concerns about direct NATO-Russia conflict have been raised by French president Emmanuel Macron & Poland's foreign minister Radek Sikorski who both recently suggested possibly sending troops into Ukraine.

NOTE: We should start by noting that while we can get the opinions of various military leaders & foreign policy experts in news coverage of the war, it's hard to get a sense of the broader expert consensus (if one exists) because there hasn't been a poll of international relations scholars that I'm aware of aside from the College of William & Mary's TRIP Program SNAP polls in March 2022 and July 2023. Those polls merely revealed that most IR scholars thought the US should sanction Russia and send military aid to Ukraine, but should not try to implement a no-fly zone and should avoid direct NATO-Russia conflict. It also showed they were concerned the "nuclear taboo" was being weakened for Russia, and that the abortive Wagner rebellion showed an instability that might make this worse. However, many also thought the Wagner incident suggested the likelihood of Russia losing the Ukraine conflict and/or leadership change occurring in Russia was higher than before.

RELEVANT MATERIAL FROM PAST MEETUPS:

In Oct. 2021, we had a meetup entitled "Can We Predict Geopolitical Conflict?" We looked at how to predict the onset of wars, WMD development & usage, military coups & popular revolts, as well as civil wars & genocide. We tried to apply some of Phil Tetlock's tips for geopolitical forecasting, like: (1) break seemingly intractable problems into tractable sub-problems, using Fermi estimates, (2) strike the right balance between "inside" (event-specific) and "outside" (reference class) views, (3) strike the right balance between under- and overreacting to new evidence, by using Bayesian-style updating, and (4) look for the clashing causal forces at work in each problem, and consider multiple theories & models.

In a meetup back in April 2022, we talked about different frameworks for understanding the Ukraine conflict (neoliberal, critical, realist, constructivist) and noted how they roughly align with different U.S. political factions (establishment Democrats & neocons, progressive activists, establishment Republicans, right-wing populists).

In Feb. 2023, we looked at the probabilities for 4 different outcomes for the "Ukraine War after 1 Year" - the same ones we'll analyze in this meetup. I've summarized major points from our earlier discussion in the Intro above.

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DIRECTIONS ON HOW TO PREPARE FOR OUR DISCUSSION:

To prepare for our discussion, just watch this recent 27-minute clip of a video from our member Aaron, watching from 1:10:50 to 1:37:30 where he & his friend Richard at the "History, Fitness, Philosophy" YouTube channel analyze recent developments in the Ukraine War - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l3Oni6Ro0Yc&t=70m50s

NOTE: The above video is the latest in a series of videos that Aaron & Richard did on the Ukraine war, starting back in March 2022: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLHCqKO_htsf67TQQc3wvyQrFk4ppMtOlE

The articles you see linked below under each section are just there to supply additional details. You can browse and look at whichever ones you want, but don't worry - we'll cover the stuff you missed in our discussion.

In terms of the discussion format, my general idea is that we'll address the topics in the order presented here. I've listed some questions under each section to stimulate discussion. We'll do our best to address most of them, as well as whatever other questions our members raise. I figure we'll spend about 30 minutes on each section.

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I. ARGUMENTS FOR WHY RUSSIA WILL WIN THE WAR (I.E. CONQUER MOST OF EASTERN UKRAINE, LEAVING ONLY A "RUMP STATE"):

  • What are the advantages and limitations of Russia's military?
  • Has support from & trade with China, Iran, India & other non-aligned countries allowed Russia to thrive despite the Western sanctions, or are they running short on high-tech parts?
  • Does Russian history (e.g. WW2) suggest Russians are tolerant of high casualties and thus have significant staying power? Or did their loss in Afghanistan suggest this can be overcome?
  • Has Russia demoralized Ukrainian citizens by bombing their cities, or has it backfired as with Germany bombing London in WW2?
  • Do attrition warfare models based on "Lanchester's laws" that take into account Russia's advantage in manpower & artillery suggest Ukraine's defensive lines will probably collapse later this year, as Peter Turchin predicts? Or are his numbers off, as Derek Jones suggests?
  • If Ukrainian lines collapse due to inadequate manpower or cuts in Western aid (esp. if Trump is elected), would this mean Ukraine would have to surrender or merely that conventional warfare would shift to insurgency?

OPTIONAL ARTICLES:

II. ARGUMENTS FOR WHY UKRAINE WILL WIN THE WAR (I.E. RECONQUER THE DONBAS, IF NOT CRIMEA), POSSIBLY CONNECTED TO REGIME CHANGE IN MOSCOW:

  • What are the advantages and limitations for Ukraine's military?
  • Given the history of the lower-intensity conflict from 2014-22 and total war since 2022, does this show Ukraine has significant staying power?
  • Are Ukraine's Western allies aligned on the objectives for the war, defense spending (as % of GDP), building offensive vs. defensive combat capability, etc.?
  • Is attrition warfare perhaps not as disastrous for Ukraine as Turchin's calculations suggest, due in part to Ukrainian artillery's better targeting - as Vikram Mittal argues?
  • Can Ukraine protect itself and buy its forces time to rest & retrain in 2024 with "defense in depth"? If so, how can it prepare for a major offensive to retake its lost territories in 2025?
  • Does the abortive Wagner coup last summer and the rise of anti-Putin Russian rebel groups in Belgorod & Kursk (as well as the ISIS-K attack) suggest Russia is becoming destabilized, allowing Ukraine to launch an offensive if/when this worsens?
  • If the West cuts support for Ukraine in 2025 (esp. if Trump is elected), could they still drain Russia through hit & run tactics, or only if Russian forces tried to expand further west?

OPTIONAL ARTICLES:

III. ARGUMENTS FOR WHY THE WAR HAS STAGNATED & WILL BECOME A "FROZEN CONFLICT" OR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT (I.E. RUSSIA RETAINS CONTROL OVER THE DONBAS & THE LANDBRIDGE TO CRIMEA):

  • Does the relatively static nature of the front in the Ukraine War make it similar to WW1 or the Iran-Iraq War? Or do these sorts of historical comparisons obscure big differences?
  • Are static battle lines with high attrition the result of Russia's superior numbers being offset by Ukraine's home field advantage & superior equipment/funding? Or is it more related to both sides failing to establish air superiority or master combined arms & maneuver warfare?
  • Have drones transformed the nature of the war in Ukraine or are their net effects fairly minor? Could enough drones allow Ukraine to break through the current stalemate?
  • Is a relatively stagnant conflict in Ukraine the unstated desire of many Western leaders, since they don't want Russia to win but also don't want Russia to lose so bad Putin resorts to nuclear weapons?

OPTIONAL ARTICLES:

IV. ARGUMENTS FOR WHY THE CONFLICT COULD RESULT IN DIRECT RUSSIA-NATO CONFRONTATION (AND WHETHER THIS WOULD LEAD TO NUCLEAR WAR):

  • To what extent has Putin's nuclear saber-rattling deterred NATO from offering more support for Ukraine, since some analysts have predicted that major losses of territory within Ukraine (esp. Donbas or Crimea) could lead him to launch a nuclear strike?
  • How serious should we take France & Poland's suggestions about stationing their troops in some Ukrainian cities? Would they commit significant manpower or just a small tripwire force to deter Russian attacks lest NATO's Article 5 get invoked?
  • Could Western air-defense forces be stationed in some of Ukraine's cities west of the Dnieper River to help protect civilian populations from long-range missiles, as Gen. Kevin Ryan suggests, or would this provoke a major escalation from Russia?
  • Would a negotiated settlement in Ukraine only embolden Putin, setting the stage for more nuclear blackmail and/or a Russian attack on a NATO country in the near future?

OPTIONAL ARTICLES:

Military
Russian
International Relations
Foreign Policy Topics
Ukraine

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