This is a continuation of our basis of metaphysics, in which after epistemology, the other major subject is ontology. Ontology in philosophy is the study of what the world consists of.
Ontology is generally driven as a derivation form epistemological assumptions. For example, Plato’s ontology was driven by the epistemology of categories. He considered the Forms of things to be so central to the world, that he then postulated they were the only real things, with the things in our material world being mere pale images or reflections of Ideal Reality of pure forms.
Plato’s thinking illustrates several common features of ontologic thought, in addition to starting with an epistemic framework. Most ontologies are “realist” in that they assert some aspect of our world to be fundamental and substantial. Most ontologies are “monist” in that only one key substance is asserted. Most also try to explain the other non-central aspects of our universe that are not part of the central essence in some process of derivations or emergence from the key substance.
In understanding ontologic theories, I find Karl Popper’s 3 worlds thinking to be a very useful framework to categorize different ideas. Popper was triplest not a monist, and held that there were three types of substances in our world: things with space and time properties (matter) he called world 1; things with time properties but no spatial properties like experiences and consciousness, which he called world 2, and things with neither time nor special properties (abstract object, relations and information) which he called world 3.
Plato’s ontology of Forms, for example, asserts a World 3 monism, with worlds 1 and 2 derivatively emergent from world 3. Another World 3 monistic ontology was that of the Neo-Platonist Plotonius, who started from the centrality of causation and inferred a timeless abstraction was needed to both start the world’s casual sequence, and serve as the end object of the world’s purpose. World 3 is then primary, and both souls and matter are derivative from it through a process of emanation.
Ontologic thinking has tended to go through cycles of popularity.
For most of history, the most popular ontology has been spiritual dualism, in which world 1 matter and world 2 souls are co-equal substances. Recent childhood psychology studies of children ross-culturally have shown that spiritual dualism is seems to be an innate view developing in most 5-8 year olds across multiple cultures. Criticisms of Descartes, in favor of monisms, have tended to become the dominant views among philosophers since then.
The acceptance of the primacy of experience, and that all other reality is only inferred FROM experience, led to a World 2 idealism starting with Kant and extending through the Phenomenologists and Existentialists of Continental philosophy.
In the Anglo-American philosophic community, the success of physics to explain about half of chemistry, and of biochemistry to explain core cellular functions, inspired the wholesale adoption of physicalism – the primary of world 1 as the essential reality. Various Identity Theories, or emergence are postulated to explain a derivative status for consciousness, and nominalism is used to explain abstract objects. Much of late 20th century and early 21st century philosophic dialog has been focused on challenges to physicalism by citing features of abstract objects, and of consciousness. These challenges have reduced the prior absolutely dominant support for physicalism down to the point it is no longer the majority view, thought it is still the pluralist view.
The classical summary of ontologic options is between mind monism, matter monism, and spiritual dualism. But the current open debate on ontology has included multiple other options, such as Russelian Monism, in which some other more fundamental substance is postulated, which has both matter and mind as emanatiions/properties of this more real substance. Or materialist pan-psychism, in which matter is postulated to have both mental and physical properties. I previously mentioned Popperian Triplism, in which mind is postulate to be emergent from matter, after which it becomes causally efficacious on its material substrate. The option space for ontic realism is currently fairly diverse with multiple live options.
Realism is also not the sole option. Anti-realists have taken the core principle of nominalism – that math theories and abstract objects can be treated as “useful fictions”, and noted that ALL of our realism theories about both matter and mind can also be treated as “useful fictions”, and maybe none of them are “real”. Non-duality takes the skepticism of nominalism even further – noting that all of our either/or boundaries (us/them, this /that) are fuzzy, and all of our categorizing therefore obscures a core principle of reality that it is more continuous and has more commonality that our either/or mindset tries to force it into.
Questions:
>> Ontic theories start with epistemic observations. There are a diversity of epistemic methodologies, and ontologies are based on different starting points. How can the differences in ontic theories be evaluated/discussed?
>> Reductionism is a dominant epistemic methodology in much thinking, but basically all ontologies depend on variations of emergence/emanation. Is the centrality of emergence a problem for ontology?
>> Is the classical set of ontologic options a useful framework, or is the broader suite of current discourse of greater interest?
>> Thoughts on anti-realist options?
We meet in person and online. In person will be on the upper level of Wegmans in Columbia. Online will be: https://teams.live.com/meet/93583191724730?p=hY3jxVvnOciVl2aRn5
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PS -- Wegman's has made an exception to their "no meetings" rule for us. They ask us to be non-disruptive, and for most of us to purchase food or drink. If someone asks, we have been given permission to meet by Ayana Douglas.