One Act, Two Laws: Should Abortion & Assisted Dying not be Governed the same?

Abortion and assisted dying both result in the deliberate termination of human life, yet they are governed by entirely different legal and ethical frameworks. This raises a central philosophical question: if the outcome is the same—the ending of a life—why are they treated so differently? In assisted dying, consent and personal autonomy are key justifications. In abortion, the focus is often on the rights of the pregnant person, while the foetus—though alive and human—cannot consent. This leads to a possible inconsistency in how we define whose life has moral or legal protection.

Both the unborn and the terminally ill are vulnerable, dependent, and unable to survive without support, yet we extend vastly different rights and protections to each. If we base laws on the value of life, autonomy, and protection of the vulnerable, shouldn't those values apply consistently? Or are we comfortable with a selective approach shaped more by political and cultural history than philosophical coherence? A unified legal and ethical framework for any act that ends life would challenge society to apply its principles—such as dignity, consent, and sanctity of life—more consistently across both the beginning and end of life.