The Symposium: Philosophy Community of Chicago

We have explored some of the exotic, almost mystical cosmology of Chinese philosophical Daoism in previous meetings. We can interpolate the vastness of philosophical thought by revisiting what is often considered the opposite extreme – the disciplined, rationalistic approach to philosophy embraced by the modern Western analytic tradition. Seemingly even more contrasting, in particular, is G. E. Moore's philosophy in defense of common sense.

However, I argue the contrast between the two philosophies is primarily in approach, not in content. It's not hard to argue the philosophies are, at least, not in conflict. More ambitiously, I argue there is some profound agreement. I argued Daoism is, in fact, quite sensible and reasonable. Common sense is considered quintessentially mundane, but Moore's arguments defending common sense are exotic and have inscrutable and ineffable implications.

In particular, Moore's essay A Defense of Common Sense is famous for arguing against philosophical skepticism – a philosophical approach valuing minimalism that, in moderate forms, consists of objecting to claims considered common knowledge, and in more radical forms, objecting to most or all claims of any knowledge. Adherents to philosophical skepticism tend to argue skepticism is the safest, most rational, and most parsimonious approach to philosophy.

A common argument against radical skepticism is that it presupposes the truth of that which it argues against – if no claim is true, then the claim "no claim is true" cannot be true. Moore takes this to a deeper, more sophisticated, more widely applicable and unexpected level in not only arguing against radical skepticism, but arguing against moderate skepticism, as well as affirming radical certainty.

Moore's essay is also famous in that it received (rare) praise by one of the most famous philosophical skeptics in 20th century philosophy – Ludwig Wittgenstein. In fact, Wittgenstein wrote his final work On Certainty in acknowledgement of and in response to Moore's essay. Moore's argument was so influential that, in On Certainty, Wittgenstein somewhat moderates his position from Philosophical Investigations, often considered the most influential philosophical work of the 20th century.

Thus, we will discuss section one of G. E. Moore's A Defense of Common Sense. The reading is short. A link is given below.

For this meetup we are putting the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics on trial. This is the version of quantum theory that most physicists have been chugging along with for almost a hundred years now. This interpretation says a particle doesn't have a definite position or spin or anything until you measure it, the wave function is just a bookkeeping device and not a real thing, and if you ask what is actually going on between measurements you get told to stop asking. Which, if you are that kind of person who shows up to a philosophy meetup on your weekends, is exactly the kind of answer that makes you want to ask harder.

What even counts as a measurement? Does a rock count? A cat? Where does the tiny world end and the regular world of chairs and coffee begin?

Then there is Many Worlds, the interpretation that says forget collapse, the math is telling the truth, and every possible outcome really happens in its own branch of reality. Yes, that means a version of you who registered for, but will skip this meetup. We feel bad for you on that one 😉

And then there’s Bohmian mechanics which says particles really do have definite properties, and there’s a real wave guiding them along. No mysterious collapse, and no branching universes — just particles being guided by a quantum wave that somehow connects everything together.

Come argue about whether Copenhagen is deep wisdom or a hundred year old shrug, and whether Many Worlds is brave or bonkers, etc.

And please feel free to bring your own interpretation as well. Relational Quantum? Objective Collapse? Something else entirely? Bring it to the table — just be prepared to defend it. 😉 No math background is required, although some of us may talk about some math things.

Bring your curiosity, and feel free to prep with the reading list below!

Suggested reading:

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (“Structure,” 1962), Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996) challenged the view that science advances through a steady accumulation of knowledge. Instead, he argued that its history is punctuated by radical “paradigm shifts.” Less widely recognized is that Kuhn’s own account of these shifts also changed significantly over time. Structure’s key claims include:

1. Science is an empirical investigation of nature. Its distinctive progress lies in an increasingly effective capacity to solve technical puzzles within clearly defined standards of success and failure.
2. Science is fundamentally social. Scientific knowledge develops through the practices, commitments, and judgments of scientific communities.
3. Scientific progress resembles biological evolution. It advances through processes of development and transformation rather than along a simple, predetermined path.

Twenty years after Structure (in “What Are Scientific Revolutions?,” c. 1981), Kuhn examines three major historical transformations involving theories of motion, the voltaic cell, and black-body radiation. Through these cases, he develops a more philosophical account of scientific change and illustrates his emerging theory of taxonomic structures.

"A new idea is first condemned as ridiculous and then dismissed as trivial, until finally, it becomes what everybody knows." - William James

I thought it might be fun to look at two works from different philosophers on a similar topic. I also especially chose these for our discussion before Halloween, as William James is heavily associated with ghosts, and David Chalmers is quite famous for the undead. Both of these works will focus on the concept of consciousness, and what exactly is entailed by that word. The first work will focus on defining the concept, the second hopes to tackle the idea of how to spot it in others. The central idea focuses on "what is consciousness?" with fun theming for the holiday.

The first work is "Does 'Consciousness' exist?" by William James, From his broader work, "Essays in Radical Empiricism" in which James lays out the various common arguments for consciousness, settling in a surprising location by questioning the nature of its existence?

The second work by Chalmers, "Zombies and The Explanatory Gap" wants to focus on a very simplistic idea: if everything is just a process of logic or chemical, why do we experience anything at all? Why is it that we are not just robotic machines of flesh?

Could it be these two are asking the same question?

In this Meetup, we will discuss both essays as well as the central question. Links to the respective texts can be found below: