The Symposium: Philosophy Community of Chicago

“… it is not enough to have a good mind; the main thing is to use it well.”

In Discourse on Method [1637], René Descartes (1596–1650) presents a scientific method and explains how it came about. The Discourse gives us insight into the intellectual climate of his time; although he had dedicated his adult life to research in philosophy, mathematics, and science, the 40-year-old Descartes had not published anything prior to this—largely due to fears of censure.

The cogito, the ideal of clear and distinct ideas, and the mechanistic conception of nature deeply influenced later rationalism (Spinoza, Leibniz), empiricism’s reactions (Locke, Hume), and Kant’s critical philosophy. The work also helped define modern subjectivity, the mind–body problem, and the idea of a unified scientific method, becoming a touchstone in epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of science.

In Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates engages the brilliant young mathematician Theaetetus in an inquiry: **What is knowledge (episteme)? Together they wrestle with perception, relativism (via Protagoras), the possibility of error, false belief, and the role of justification or "account" (logos).
The discussion unfolds through three main definitions:

• Is knowledge simply perception?
• Is it true judgment (or true belief)?
• Is it true judgment with an account (what many see as an early version of "justified true belief")?

Socrates famously likens himself to a midwife of ideas—helping others give birth to thoughts while exposing their flaws. The dialogue is rich with puzzles about relativism, flux (Heraclitus), the nature of the mind, and why defining knowledge proves so elusive. It ends in aporia (impasse), but that very frustration sparks insight into the questions: How do we know what we know? Can we ever escape circularity or skepticism?
Please read (or listen to) as much as you can in advance. We are splitting this work into two separate meetup sessions.

Session 1: Up to the end of the second definition ( through ~200d or so)

• Covers: Introduction, the midwife metaphor, Knowledge = Perception (and its refutation via Protagoras/Heraclitus), and Knowledge = True Judgment (including puzzles about false belief, the Wax Tablet, and Aviary models).

Resources:

In Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates engages the brilliant young mathematician Theaetetus in an inquiry: What is knowledge (episteme)? Together they wrestle with perception, relativism (via Protagoras), the possibility of error, false belief, and the role of justification or "account" (logos). The discussion unfolds through three main definitions:

• Is knowledge simply perception?
• Is it true judgment (or true belief)?
• Is it true judgment with an account (what many see as an early version of "justified true belief")?

Socrates famously likens himself to a midwife of ideas—helping others give birth to thoughts while exposing their flaws. The dialogue is rich with puzzles about relativism, flux (Heraclitus), the nature of the mind, and why defining knowledge proves so elusive. It ends in aporia (impasse), but that very frustration sparks insight into the questions: How do we know what we know? Can we ever escape circularity or skepticism?
Please read (or listen to) as much as you can in advance. We split this work into two separate sessions, now focusing on part 2.

Session 2 ~200d to End

• Continuing directly from Part 1, today we’ll tackle the third and final major definition in Plato’s Theaetetus: Is knowledge true judgment with an account (logos)? This section features the fascinating Dream Theory (breaking things down into simple elements), critiques of that approach, and the dialogue’s famous ending in aporia (impasse). Why does defining knowledge prove so difficult? What does the lack of a final answer teach us? We’ll revisit the midwife role, reflect on circularity in knowledge, and connect the ideas to broader Platonic themes and epistemology.

Resources: