The Blind Spot of Knowledge's Physiology

To what degree can the eye see itself?

Trivially, a mirror gets us a long way. However, are there any direct means? Can that which sees see itself, directly? Besides being, perhaps, an annoying question that epitomizes why people avoid philosophy, physics dissolves interest in this question to all but the most intransigent idealists.

The idea of irreducible atoms of idealism - that which looks and that which is being seen - is dissolved by the analytical insight modernity has granted us. As physical analysis grates down that which looks and that which is seen into more fundamental components, it, too, grates down interest in the question. It dissolves the difference between "direct" and "indirect" by revealing this difference is an heuristic artifact endemic to human comprehension of things, not endemic to things. Moreover, physical analysis reveals an emitter of light cannot, at one instant, also receive and process that light. The seeing-seen system is broken down into progressively smaller units of time and space, thereby also breaking down any paradox. We should not be surprised. The eye, light, and the brain are best described by physics, and physics, serving as a preeminent instrument of analysis, has a history of breaking down philosophical paradoxes.

However, we can use this question as a bridge to cross over into the conceptual realm. In this case, all but the most intransigent physicalists will agree decently defined concepts cannot be dissolved by physical analysis. In particular, we can ask “to what degree can the concept of knowledge be known?”. The tool used to interrogate this question (pun intended) is a different kind of analysis – philosophical analysis, or perhaps more appropriately, analytic philosophy. Does philosophical analysis dissolve interest in this question?

Edmund Gettier’s Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? does more than analyze to what degree the concept of knowledge can be known. It bestows a ground-breaking argument challenging canonical models of knowledge – demonstrating we knew far less about the concept of knowledge than we thought we knew – in two pages. Its succinctness, directness, and analytic style demonstrates it is a prototype for, not merely an example of, analytic philosophy. It is a distillation of the analytic style to its purist form.

Historically speaking, Gettier's paper did the opposite of dissolve interest in discovering what knowledge is – it ignited it.

Thus, for our meeting, please read Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? by Edmund Gettier. The entire paper barely exceeds two pages, and it can be accessed here. We will discuss it in our in-person meeting.

All those of any familiarity and background are welcome.

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I don't know what Meetup did with the comments section, but I will note here the secondary literature on this topic is boundless. I do recommend the struggle involved in trying to understand the primary source, as traversing through such density and austerity is rewarding. However, further information is provided in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy and in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (the Wikipedia article isn't bad either).