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This meeting will be a live discussion of the title topic. This sort of discussion can't be settled in any particular way, but remains relevant for beginners and initiates to philosophy.

Here are some questions and comments that may help guide the conversation (feel free to bring questions of your own, as well):

Human beings are not at home in nature, not merely because we aren't well-suited to a life without shelter, but because we experience anxiety about our own existence.

If humans have free will or possess a soul, then we may have to acknowledge our existence beyond nature.

Additionally, humans may not fit with nature even in our pursuit of purpose, contrasting with an existence that truly has no purpose. In this case, our existential homelessness is a bad fit between the nature of the meaning of existence and existence itself.

If we are merely natural, or more than natural, what implications does this have?

"Now we have in the world only a single sort of beings whose causality is teleological, i.e., aimed at ends and yet at the same time so constituted that the law in accordance with which they have to determine ends is represented by themselves as unconditioned and independent of natural conditions but yet as necessary in itself. The being of this sort is the human being, though considered as noumenon: the only natural being in which we can nevertheless cognize, on the basis of its own constitution, a supersensible faculty (freedom) and even the law of the causality together with the object that it can set for itself as the highest end (the highest good in the world)." - Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment

"When I investigate the cause of these, I observe that, besides the real and positive idea of God, or the supremely perfect being, there is also, so to speak, a certain negative idea of nothingness, or of that which is infinitely remote from all perfections, that presents itself to me; and I see also that I am so constituted as a medium term between God and nothingness, or between the supreme being and non-being, that, in so far as I was created by the supreme being, there is indeed nothing within me by which I can be deceived or led into error; but that, in so far as I have, in a way, a share of nothingness or non-being (in so far, in other words, as I am not myself the supreme being), and very many things are lacking to me, it does not seem so strange that I should be deceived." - Descartes, Meditation IV

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