Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, a slow reading, a careful study (Session 16)

For overall group description, see the page that announced first event, which lists required reading,

https://www.meetup.com/The-Toronto-Philosophy-Meetup/events/277446352/

then come back to this page to see where we are at now and to RSVP to upcoming meeting.

NEXT READING FOR SESSION 16: We had another great discussion. I certainly feel less befuddled by the Kantian terminology. For next session, we will read Subsection 2 of Section III, Systematic representation of all synthetic principles of pure understanding" and we will start the third subsection. So please read pp. 290 thru 304 or paragraphs A166/B208 thru A189/B232. And as always, I encourage you to reread the earlier section because we really never finish our earlier discussions but become more insightful about them as we progress.US

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

24. A157/B196/p282: "The possibility of experience is therefore that which gives all of our cognitions a priori objective reality." How is objective being defined here?
25. In the same paragraph, "Experience therefore has principles of its form which ground it a priori . . . " What is the form of experience?
26. If experience provides objectivity, are logical truths objective?
27. What is the difference between an axiom and a formula according to A165/B205/pp288-289?
28. What the H-E-double hockey sticks does this mean? "Now since sensation in itself is not an objective representation, and in it neither the intuition of space nor time is to be encountered, it has to be sure, no extensive magnitude but yet it still has a magnitude?" (B208/P2 90) Is Kant referring to the concept of sensation or is he referring to any particular sensation? Because while any particular sensation might have a measurable magnitude, the concept doesn't.
29. What does Kant mean when he says, "In inner sense, namely, the empirical consciousness can be raised from 0 up to any greater degree. . ."? How can consciousness be measured on a scale? Is Kant referring to some degree of wakefulness? (B217/p294).
30. In the opening to "Analogies of Experience," Kant states, "Experience is an empirical cognition. . . It is therefore a synthesis of perception, which is not itself contained in perception but contains the synthetic unity of the manifold of perception in our consciousness, which constitutes what is essential in the cognition of objects of the senses, i.e., of experience (not merely of the intuition or sensation of the senses)." If I understand this correctly, Kant is saying that consciousness is necessary for the perception of objects but not necessary for raw sensation. I'm not really sure what raw sensation is. Are we capable of that without consciousness? Would dreaming be an example?
31. Why does Kant say in B189/p279 that mathematical principles are drawn only from intuition and not from the pure concept of the understanding?
32. A1 59/B198/p283 "Even laws of nature . . . carry with them an expression of necessity, thus at least the presumption of determination by grounds that are a priori and valid and prior to all experience." How does this statement relate to Kant's idea of objectivity? Is something being expressed about the noumenal?
33. B203/pp286–287: "[Appearances] cannot be apprehended. . . , taken up into empirical consciousness, except through the synthesis of the manifold through which the representations of a determined space or time are generated, i.e., through the composition of that which is homogenous. . ." I can follow the first part of this of this sentence, that appearances can only be comprehended once they are synthesized in a manifold of determinate space and time which itself is grounded in the indeterminate intuitions of space and time, but I don't understand what is meant by "homogenous composition." Why is this concept necessary to the apprehension of appearances?
34. In A166/B207/p289, Kant refers to the "transcendental principle of the mathematics of appearances." What does this profound concept refer to?
35. B208/p290: "Appearances, as objects of perception, are not pure (merely formal) intuitions, like space and time (for these cannot be perceived in themselves). They therefore also contain in addition to the intuition the materials for some object in general (through which something existing in space or time is represented), i.e., the real of the sensation, is merely subjective representation, by which one can only be conscious that the subject is affected, and which one relates to an object in general." Can someone expressing non-Kantian language how Kant is here defining the term "real"?