Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, a slow reading, a careful study (Session 24)

For overall group description, see the first event page. . .

https://www.meetup.com/The-Toronto-Philosophy-Meetup/events/277446352/

. . . then if you decide to take the red pill, come back to this page and RSVP to the next event.

EPISODE XXIV: The Force awakens. . . We had a great discussion about Kantian Dialectic, his concept of a syllogism, rules vs principles, and even questioned our objective reality (or at least Kant's reality). Having sampled the wading pool that is Kant's introduction to the Dialectic, we are now going to try the Adult Swim that is Book I of the Dialectic, "On the Concepts of Pure Reason." Wait a minute! Haven't we talked about pure concepts before, or was that all a Transcendental Illusion? To find out what's real, READ PAGES 394 THROUGH 408 for next meeting.

QUESTIONS

1. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. What is the pure use of reason? What would an impure use be?
2. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. B307: "however it may be with the with the possibility of concepts from pure reason, they are not merely reflected concepts but inferred concepts." What does Kant mean by "reflected concepts"? Is this a reference to the Amphiboly? Or does "reflected" means something different here?
3. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. Trying to understand what Kant means by "pure reason" as opposed to "pure understanding." Proposition: pure reason is to pure understanding what general logic is to transcendental logic. What do you think? Have I nailed it or what?
4. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. Also there is no such thing as "impure" reason. All reason, all logic, is "pure." But there is such a thing as bad reasoning or pseudo logic, what Kant refers to as ratiocination. What do you think of this interpretation?
5. IDEAS IN GENERAL. Kant starts first section of our reading with a remark about the lack of precision in language which makes it a difficult tool to communicate concepts, a suggestion to look at concepts conveyed in ancient languages, specifically ancient Greek, and a contrast of Plato's concept of "idea" with Aristotle's. This seems an odd digression.
6. IDEAS IN GENERAL. A315/B372/p396: "Whoever would draw the concepts of virtue from experience, whoever would make what can at best serve as an example for imperfect illustration into a model for a source of cognition (as many actually have done), would make a virtue an ambiguous non-entity, changeable with time and circumstances, useless for any sort of rule." Do we agree with this? That experience cannot be used as a rule for virtuous behavior? This seems a rather harsh condemnation of empiricism and a return to Cartesian rigidity. What does he mean by making "experience. . . serve as . . . a source of cognition."?
7. IDEAS IN GENERAL. Kant says in A320/B376/p396 that it is important to preserve the original meaning of "idea." What exactly is that original meaning and how exactly has that meaning deteriorated in later usage?
8. TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. So pure reason is all about syllogism? Is the syllogism to pure reason what the categories are to pure understanding?
9. TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. 1) Example of a necessary concept of pure reason? 2) Difference between a concept of pure reason and a concept of pure understanding? 3) What is a transcendental idea?
10. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. The book is called Critique of Pure Reason, but only now, after 300 pages, does Kant discuss pure reason. Why now? Why has Kant taken so long to get to the subject matter of the book title?
11. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. An interpretation I read online. 1) Transcendental aesthetic, space-time intuition, makes mathematics possible. 2) Transcendental analytic, pure understanding, makes science possible. 3) The transcendental dialectic, pure reason, makes metaphysics possible. Discuss and critique.
12. TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. An interpretation of reason according to Marcus Willaschek, Kant on the Source of Metaphysics: "Reason . . .is the capacity to logically derive particular cognitions from more general ones by means of intermediary cognitions, as in the inference: 'All humans are mortal; all philosophers are human; thus, all philosophers are mortal.’" Do you agree this is what Kant means by reason?