Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, a slow reading, a careful study (Session 4)

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SESSION 4 READING - We will start the first edition section on Transcendental Aesthetics, specifically the section on space. Please read pp 153-161 in Transcendental Aesthetics A section of the Critique

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS FOR UPCOMING MEETING

Latest at 7/3/21

• [ ] 14. This opening statement in its entirety seems to provide two definitions of intuition: that “ . . . at which all thought as a means is directed as an end. . . “ and “the way . . . a cognition relates to an object. . .” Are these two separate definitions? They do not, on the surface seem to say the same thing.
• [ ] 15. In the opening to Transcendental Aesthetics A, how does Kant distinguish sensibility from understanding and intuition from thought?

4. 157/A22. “In the transcendental aesthetic we will therefore first isolate sensibility by separating off anything that the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing but empirical intuition remains.” Is empirical intuition empirical?

• [x] 5. 155/A20. “I call that in appearance which corresponds to sensation its matter.” Is it a contradiction to use matter and appearance in this definition?
• [x] 6. What for Kant, is the distinction between matter and form?
• [x] 7. 156/A21 - “. . . the pure form of intuition in general is to be encountered in the mind a priori, wherein all of the manifold of appearances is intuited in certain relations. This pure form of sensibility itself is also called pure intuition.” We might ask ourselves if its called that by anyone but him, but a more serious question: what’s the difference between pure and impure intuition?
• [x] 8. “I call a scientce of all of principles a priori sensibility the transcendental aesthetic. There must . . . be such a science, which constitutes the the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in contrast to that which contains the principles of pure thinking, and is named transcendental logic.” What’s the relationship between transcendental elements and transcendental logic?
• [x] 9. This is a difficult question related to Kant’s fn on p 156/A21 wherein he says Baumgarten aesthetic project is futile. It’s difficult because I want to see to what extent we can by looking at our primary text (not secondary sources) determine why Kant finds this project futile. To make it easier to answer, we can extend the definition of “primary text” to include Guyer’s introduction and footnotes.
  #10. On 157/A22, Kant outlines a method to arrive at pure intuition. What is that method and how does it relate to forms?
  #11. The purpose of these questions is to engender thoughtful discussion, but as some of you find them rather simple and unproductive, they may to result in rather unthoughtful discussion. That’s a fair criticism. It’s hard to always kick a field goal. So let me turn the tables and ask you all whether you find anything in this introduction to the transcendental aesthetic confusing or perplexing or requiring further clarification?
• 12. Kant opens the intro to the transcendental aesthetic by defining intuition as the means whereby a cognition relates to an object. Do we have any examples of this cognition-object relation?
• 13. The opening sentence states that intuition is that “. . . at which all thought as a means is directed as an end . . .” Is he saying here something about judgment?