Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, a slow reading, a careful study (Session 6)

This page gives info about the most current session. For overall details about the group, please see the first event page here —

https://www.meetup.com/The-Toronto-Philosophy-Meetup/events/277446352/

—and then come back to this page to RSVP!!!

SESSION 6 READING. So you really don’t want to miss the next meeting where we will discuss Allison’s 19 page intro in his book (see Amazon link below) as well as the flip side of the Transcendental Aesthetics. I know people always bought the record for the A side single, but in Kant’s case, his second edition is an improved explanation of time and space (fingers crossed). So also read in the Ctitique, pages 172-178, which will cover the second edition explanation of space. We’ll save the second edition explanation of time for the following meetup.

For Allison’s book: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense (Second Edition) by Henry E. Allison

Canada: https://www.amazon.ca/Kants-Transcendental-Idealism-Interpretation-Enlarged/dp/0300102666/

US: https://www.amazon.com/Kants-Transcendental-Idealism-Interpretation-Defense/dp/0300102666/

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS. Updated 7/30/21

14. 172/B34 - “The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance.” Why “undetermined”?
15. Same para - “. . . the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori.” Does Kant prove this? Or does he only assert it?
16. 174/B38 - In the section, “Metaphysical exposition of this concept,” Kant says in B38, p 174, “17. Continuing B38 - “. . . but the exposition is metaphysical when it contains that which exhibits the concept as given a priori.” How does this “metaphysical” exposition contrast with his “transcendental” exposition which he brings up in the following section, <§3?
17. 177/B42 - “Space is nothing other than merely the form of all appearance of outer sense, i.e., the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible.”

PREVIOUS QUESTIONS

8. On his p 16 (in the middle) Allison argues for an “epistemologically-based understanding of transcendental idealism...[and this]... requires that the transcendental distinction between appearances and things in themselves be understood as holding between two ways of considering things...rather than ...between two ontologically distinct sets of entities. Can you find anything in the little bit of Kant we have read so far that supports or refutes this reading? Is Allison's reading at least consistent with what we have read so far in Kant?
9. What according to opening paragraph of Kant reading, is the difference between sensibility and sensation?
10. Why does Kant say that space is an outer intuition and time an inner intuition? Do we agree with him?
11. What is the “transcendental exposition”?
12. In the opening para to Transcendental Aesthetics B, Kant says, “. . . all thought. . . must, ultimately be related to intuitions.” What are these “certain marks” that Kant speaks of?
13. Kant says to says that space is not a property of objects nor a kind of relation that exists “out there,” independent of our minds, but rather space is an inner intuition that orders our appearances of those objects. So then can we say of certain facts, e.g., the earth is rounded, that it is objectively true? When space, and maybe even roundedness are inner orders of appearance