San Francisco Philosophy Reading Group

Block's paper introduces the "Harder Problem of Consciousness," distinct from Chalmers's Hard Problem. Where the Hard Problem asks why neural processes give rise to subjective experience at all, the Harder Problem is epistemological and tied to other minds: if we encountered a being like Star Trek's Commander Data — functionally identical to us but built from entirely different physical stuff — we would have no rational ground for believing it is conscious and no rational ground for believing it isn't. Worse, Block argues the question is "meta-inaccessible": we don't even know what would count as evidence for settling it.

This creates a tension between two commitments many philosophers hold simultaneously. Naturalism (default physicalism) pushes toward denying Data's consciousness, since there's no shared physical property to ground phenomenal overlap with us. But phenomenal realism — the view that consciousness is real and not reducible to functional descriptions — insists the question must remain genuinely open. Block doesn't resolve this tension; he argues it reveals that being both a phenomenal realist and a naturalist is less comfortable than most philosophers assume, lending what he calls "a grain of truth" to accusations that phenomenal realism harbors a kind of closet dualism.

You can find the paper here