What we’re about
You may sometimes wonder about fundamental things. Philosophers incline to it non-stop. At their best, they make trouble in the world of ideas. They open worm cans. Bring your can openers!
We have explored — or will (or will again) — age-old topics like God's existence, the nature of people and things, truth, justice, knowledge, free will, determinism, fatalism, birth, death, the right way to live or die... as well as theories in the major divisions of philosophical thought such as logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Exploring these core areas can help with understanding what is at stake in the more concrete topics we also address, which include controversies around abortion, infanticide, capital punishment, suicide (physician-assisted and otherwise), economic and social equality, criminality, genetic engineering, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, technology, over-population, depopulation, war, terrorism, racism, sexism, feminism, transhumanism, antinatalism, procreation ethics, speciesism, sexuality, human "rights," animal rights, the "rights" of (or to) anything whatsoever!,... as well as important issues in medical ethics, political philosophy, environmental ethics, bioethics, philosophy of law, of art, of literature, of religion, of science and its methods; and the nature, history, and methods of philosophy itself... not to exclude philosophical topics as yet uninvented.
In fact, "inventing topics" is a side effect of asking hard questions, which inevitably lead to still harder questions. Often enough, "new" topics are not really "new" but old, even ancient, unsettled concerns resurfacing. And it is those unsettled issues that are the real philosophical problems. As one philosopher once said, "If it has a solution, it was probably just science anyway." Any important subject whose fundamental ideas invite critical examination is ripe for our can opener... eventually we may work our way up to the really big can: the point of it all! (But don't expect pat answers — we don't do self-help.)
This club is open to serious approaches to philosophy — analytic, "Continental," and otherwise. Philosophy in the Anglo-American world (for better or worse) is still dominated by some form of conceptual analysis. What characterizes the analytic approach to philosophy is attention to clarity and as much rigor as we can muster in our concepts and arguments — while, hopefully, keeping one foot in reality. (It's not "clear" that "reality" has anything to do with "clarity" or "rigor.") We ply "belief systems" with questions framed against such values. But you may know better! Philosophical traditions, no less than individual philosophical views, are error prone. Any "philosophy" worthy of the name should be comfortable with this.
We will try to stay focused on the topics under discussion, realizing that this is difficult. If one thing doesn't connect with another, it can't be that important. We draw on the insights of some of the brightest thinkers we know, both living and dead. Celebrated authority is no guarantee of being right. In fact, we already know at least half of the great philosophical thinkers must be wrong because the other half disagrees with them. But which half? (Even to assume only half are wrong is being more than a little optimistic. Why would any of them be right?)
Though we range widely in the topics we cover, we try not to let anything go in our discussion. The point is to rise above the level of BS that too often passes in informal discussions for philosophy. Beyond a certain respect for clarity and rigor, we do not have an axe to grind. You may bring your own axe, we may sharpen it for you... or we may grind it to a stump. We mostly open worm cans, remember? You decide what to do with the worms!
Skepticism and disagreement are to be expected, even encouraged. We should try to make the best case we can for our side and attend to what others say. We should expect that expressions of conviction may be forceful and that’s fine, as long as they are respectful of others and rational, which, in the context of a philosophy club, means to attempt to offer reasons to believe — reasons that are thought out and not themselves more controversial than the claims they are meant to support. These are aspirations, of course, not actual descriptions of what happens in even earnest philosophical discussions. We should nevertheless try...
A word about etiquette, again: philosophy, by its nature, is contentious. Expect disagreement and treat each other respectfully. Failure to do so may be cause for removal.
See the collection of archived writeups for perspective on the topics we have and may cover. Check out recorded sessions. See also Philosophical Resources Online.
The group is international and mostly online. Formal membership is not required to attend and participate. Contact us for the video link if you just want to try it without membership. Our meetings and resources are free and open to the public. Auditing is perfectly fine.
Finally, if you know something about a topic and would like us to address it or you would like to present and host it yourself, let us know. You don't have to be an expert. We will work with you. So long as we can make out a philosophical angle — it addresses fundamental questions about an important subject, we would love to explore it.
Contact us with any questions.
— Victor Muñoz, organizer
Upcoming events (4)
See all- Conspiracism and demarcationLink visible for attendees
– or the tendency to believe in a conspiracy as an explanation for some (usually undesirable) social phenomenon. A conspiracy is usually defined as a belief or set of beliefs promulgated by a small group of persons with nefarious motives, but we will take a closer look at the concept.
Sometimes I don’t know where the bullshit ends and the truth begins.
– Joe Gideon in All that Jazz– the demarcation problem...
– Karl PopperThough the initial number of promulgators of a conspiracy theory must be small (otherwise, it is a movement and can hardly be secret), the number of believers in the theory may be very large. The promulgators must also intend to convey what is false (for it to remain a “conspiracy” and not an epistemic disagreement), otherwise they are not true conspirators but mistaken believers. However, the believers themselves may be many and sincere in their belief – and even correct in their belief.
Thus,
- the number conspirators must be small relative to the audience they intend to deceive,
- though the number of believers may be very large,
- the conspirators must be aware of the falseness or unlikelihood of their theory,
- while the believers need not be,
- the motivations of the conspirators must be dishonest and not just careless, and
- the most dangerous and effective conspiracies are the products of persons empowered to promulgate
Conspiracies usually dissipate with increased understanding of the states of affairs they purport to describe. They are either replaced by more widely accepted understandings (more or less "truish") or by other conspiracies.
We are going to work toward spelling out criteria for evaluating supposed conspiracy theories. Can a conspiracy theory be true? Yes. Can what it is opposed to, the “official” theory, be a conspiracy, too – or instead? Yes and yes. What are we to believe? How can we tell if a conspiracy is well-founded? In some cases, it is easy. In others, the most philosophically interesting cases, not. We will explore why this is.
This topic falls within the sub branch of philosophy called doxastics, philosophical questions around “belief.” Doxastics is a branch of epistemology, the general study of knowledge, what it is and how it works. It also crosses into ethics, ideas about how we should interact with each other, since knowledge and belief can affect our actions.
Examples of conspiracies can range from the near ludicrous to the quite plausible, from why smoking was once touted a health benefit to Watergate, from Hilary Clinton’s association with a ring of sex-traffickers operating out of a pizza parlor, which some connected with a child slave colony of Mars, to the true cause of and so-called “science” involved in the recent pandemic; from whether Elvis is still alive or who killed Kennedy or who is responsible for 9/11, or to why Jeffery Epstein’s alleged “client list” has not been made public.
A conspiracy can be vast and pervasive – practically global, because there are gradations of awareness. Large numbers of people may be dimly aware that the United States, for example, is a democracy “in name only,” yet still go to the polls “believing” their vote matters. Conspiracies may be local and targeted at certain individuals or small groups. To “gaslight,” as in the classic movie of that name, can focus on making as few as one person feel they are losing their mind.
To the extent one’s own motives are disingenuousness, or we are barely aware of them, or seek to suppress them, it seems one may “conspire” even against oneself. But here we will address conspiracy as a social phenomena. Certain societal background conditions make appeal to conspiracy especially tempting. At the top of the list is loss of trust in social institutions. How does that happen?
Demarcation
Karl Popper, in the early 1960s, famously proposed criteria for sorting science from pseudo-science, theories that do not adhere to received methods that define science. When speculation, untestable hypotheses, and subjective impressions want to sport the label “science,” this is “pseudo-science.” Popper had in mind especially Freudian psychoanalysis and some Marxist theories of history as paradigm cases of pseudo-science. Whatever truthful or useful insights result from these theories, they are not sciences, they border on astrology and homeopathic medicine. Again, a pseudo-science is not necessarily incorrect or a waste of time, it’s just not science. Popper proposed as a test of sciencehood whether a theory could make predictions: if the predictions failed, then the theory that generated them was falsified.Popper’s theory of falsification was influential and garnered a lot of attention in the philosophy of science, some quite critical. How human knowledge progresses is more complicated than he imagined. Nevertheless, falsificationism remains the gold standard, if there is one, in certain areas of science, allopathic medicine, for example. Randomized controlled trials are touted as the best way to settle the question of the effectiveness of a drug or treatment. If a remedy tested this way is significantly effective, then it has at least not been falsified – yet. It’s important to note that real scientific explanations, hypotheses and theories must always be open to being tested and retested. What passes a test today, may not tomorrow. Revisionism is built into any genuine scientific method. This is because the ideal is reliable information – as close to truth as we may get. And if the stakes are high, as in one’s physical or mental health, the drive to achieve epistemic intimacy with “truth” is urgent.
But the stakes can be high in many other areas of experience such as in collective decisions with major social consequences. What we believe, the explanations we accept, the authorities we recognize, effect decisions, and decisions can effect the quality of lives and even life itself. So if one proposes an explanation for a phenomenon with grave consequences, something we should do something about on pain of suffering them, we need to evaluate the explanation. If there are competing explanations, we need to decide between them. How?
Some explanations are labeled “conspiracies.” Others are labeled “official” or widely accepted. It is usually an epistemic “best practice” to adhere to the “official” or received explanations. These are usually propounded by those qualified to judge in the relevant area of concern. “Conspiracy,” in popular usage, carries with it dismissive connotations. A “conspiracy” can be epistemically defective because not many people believe it, or the ones that do are not qualified to judge it, or they are motivated by non-epistemic, “ulterior” motives, or the believers are willfully ignorant, etc. One more thing: if the promulgators are in positions of communicative power, the stakes are magnified.
Why “usually” and not “always”? Because official theories by recognized authorities are empowered promulgators almost by definition. Unless the principles of the promulgators override every predictable pressure humans are subject to, their theories, too, are compromised – especially and dangerously so by their empowered status.
As with demarcation tests in science, is there a simple method for identifying when an explanation is conspiratorial and when we ought to take it seriously? In the cases that matter most, there isn’t.
Almost all scientifically fruitful explanations we accept now were classed as wrong-headed or conspiratorial when first proposed (and some for a very long time after): the heliocentric theory of why lights in the night sky move the way do, the theory of plate tectonics, proto-theories of what we now call “hormones,” that the earth is not flat, what killed off the dinosaurs, etc… If someone says, “but we know better now, we cannot be fooled again,” they know little of the history of science.
Social “conspiracies” are even more subject to premature dismissal.
There is an ambiguity in the usage of the term “conspiracy.” It may mean:
- The explanation has been rationally evaluated and duly found wanting in support or credibility, or
- we are occupied by other things and feel compelled to rely on the judgment of real or supposed authorities, such as politicians, media, or people presenting as authorities whose qualifications we cannot scrutinize, again, because of our preoccupation. The reality is we must be excused for the preoccupation: we have lives to live and the world is complicated. We must rely on others who are in a better position to know when an explanation is, or is not, a conspiracy.
Excusable or not, the second reason for dismissal is not the same as the first. This is where philosophical analysis parts company with popular views on what counts as a conspiracy. Philosophers are in the business of mulling things over; they are licensed to waste time.
Resources
- The IEP entry on “Conspiracy Theories” by Marc Pauly is a particularly good and accessible introduction to the philosophical thinking on this subject. Among other considerations, the article brings up the question, when has a “degenerating research program” – that is, a once “official,” now obsolescing, desperate explanation – been mistaken for a conspiracy theory? Efforts to shore up established scientific thinking often share features with conspiracy theories. When does “established” become “sclerotic”? This transition must happen for progress in, or out of, science. In that transition, there is and ought to be ample room for “thinking outside the box.” The big question: how far outside the box?
- “Philosophy and conspiracy theories,” Mr Blakley offers a video survey of the philosophical controversies surrounding conspiracy theories: the trouble with defining conspiracy theory, generalist vs particularist evaluations, the demarcation problem between dismissible and plausible theories and the similarity to that between science and pseudo-science.
- “The Interstellar Object 3I/ATLAS, Avi Loeb and Aliens,” Cool Worlds, hosted by astronomer David Mathew Kipping. Is one of the world’s top scientists, Avi Loeb, trading in conspiracy? This controversy illustrates how close science can get to what many would call “conspiracy,” while still being legitimate science. Genuine scientific thinking must keep an open mind, but, again, how open? Till your brains fall out?
- “Naomi Wolf: ‘Von der Leyen Lied About Pfizer Safety’ – EU Parliament in Shock | APT” Liberal feminist journalist Naomi Wolf speaks before the European Parliament. The occasion for her alarming talk is the book she edited, The Pfizer Papers: Pfizer’s Crimes Against Humanity. She is accused of being a conspiracist for exposing Pfizer’s internal documents on the adverse effects of mRNA vaccines. Is well-documented concern for reproductive health, and health in general – no matter where the political chips fall – a conspiracy?
- Monsanto: “Exposing Why Farmers Can’t Legally Replant Their Own Seeds,” Veritasium. Notice the fingerprints of “conspiracy”: 1. Secrecy, i.e., lack of transparency, 2. Nefarious motives, and 3. Power to inform, or shape communication, i.e., subvert authority (science, academia, regulation, legislation, etc.). What does this do to public trust in institutions? Should we wonder at antivaxxers, et al.? Where does the bullshit end and the truth begin?
- AI and “maternal instincts” | Geoffrey Hinton’s proposalLink visible for attendees
AI will not kill us off. Something natural might. Something artificial might. Something intelligent might, e.g., ourselves. Something dumb might, e.g., ourselves. But not something “artificially intelligent.”
Watch this short interview with Hinton, then watch Daniel Hentschel’s therapy session with AI. AI puts up with Hentschel with the infinite patience only an AI could muster. Could a mother do as well?
On the concepts, “artificial,” “natural,” and “intelligence”
Nobel laureate computer/cognitive scientist Geoffrey Hinton thinks, unless we do something rather fast, we are going to be supplanted as the paragons of “intelligence” we think we are. The “something” he suggests is that we instill maternal instincts in AI in an effort to forestall our impending obsolescence and potential disposal. I find the suggestion conceptually strange, apart from whether it’s even possible. Unless we become very different kinds of beings from the ones we are now, in which case, the moral non-identity-across-change problem looms – for then, in that case, since it won’t involve anything recognizable as us – why should we care? But given that our values won’t radically change, AI will not displace us. Something might, but not any kind of artificial “intelligence.” What Hinton is suggesting seems confused or mysterious to me. I will explain why.
He remarks in the course of his argument that Mother Nature invented “maternal instincts” in (some) animals. But Nature does not “invent” anything. It engages in blind processes. Or, rather, nature is the sum total of blind processes. It doesn’t have “purposes” or “aims.” We are projecting how we judge our behavior onto impersonal natural processes.
Maybe Hinton is hinting that we will – in spite of ourselves, not that we should – program maternal instincts into our artificial creations because this is the only way we can behave consistently with our history of self-preservation: because it is natural that natural beings like us naturalize our creations in order to understand and cope with them. In which case, he is describing what will happen based on induction, predicting we will do this, not recommending that we should. Just as we can predict how gravity behaves – things fall toward the earth, not toward the sky – not that we can suggest to gravity that it should behave that way or differently. Iron oxidizes, some trees drop their leaves in the fall... For awhile (tentatively, because no basic law of nature forces the case), individual members of a species live, then they die. For awhile (tentatively, because no basic law of nature forces the case), whole species thrive, then they go extinct. Why anything in nature happens the way it does is not because nature “wants” it to happen. Stuff happens, period. We discern patterns in the behavior we observe. We approve some of those patterns, not others, but that’s all we can say about them without anthropomorphizing (projecting our feelings on natural processes as our prehistoric – if not, evolutionary – forbears could not help doing). I am not saying that anthropomorphizing is necessarily fallacious or even avoidable, only that it might be more helpful to be clear-headed when we are doing it.
If Hinton is not predicting what will happen, then he is recommending a course of action. Recommendations have to be possible to be taken seriously. A possible recommendation is one that is, at least, clear as to its meaning and implications: either, we are acting in the world, or we are acting on it.
If the former, everything we do, or can do, is perfectly natural. The “artificial” cannot exist. How can it? Our AIs are no more “artificial” than a bird’s nest is.
If the latter, then the implication is that, if we can step outside the laws that govern nature, then “artificial” refers to what we do when we step outside. Assuming we are free to do that, then we can speak of “shoulds” and entertain recommendations when talking about, at least, our behavior. Then the concept “artificial” becomes meaningful. Then we can try to instill the conditions for animal-like behavior, motherly or otherwise, in AI... But the concepts “artificial” and “instinct” are exclusive because “instinctual” is ordinarily captured by the predicate “natural.” Without contradiction, something cannot be both “natural” and “artificial” (i.e., the product of artifice) at the same time. It’s either one or the other.
Or, again, Hinton is just using a metaphor when he invokes the idea of “maternal instinct.” Nothing wrong with being poetic, so long as you are aware that’s what you are doing. The only caveat is that, if the project has ethical implications, then poetic thinking can be dangerous. “As if” thinking is one of our most powerful tools for understanding the world. Combining such thinking with science and technology, because of the latter’s potential for real material world effect, is freighted with concern. Scientists do not ordinarily think of themselves as doing poetry. They operate as though what they do connects with some truth or reality independent of their instruments and motivation. Science, correctly or incorrectly, aspires to seriously address and impinge on the world. That’s why confusion here is consequential.
What we call maternal instinct or behavior evolved because it is one mechanism, among others, for insuring some species persist and thrive – for awhile. Why “for awhile”? Why not forever? Or why at all? And what is “insuring”?... There is no literal “insuring” here, really. Not anymore than gravity “insures” that stuff falls downward when unsupported – as though gravity “thinks” it is a “lovely idea” for things to want to be intimate with the earth.
Dinosaurs and a thousand other extinct species no doubt had mothering instincts and look at what they did and what happened to them. Some creatures have mothering instincts rather alien to us (such as producing thousand of potential offspring, then abandoning them, a scattershot strategy for species survival).
By definition, an “instinct” is a natural impulse. It isn’t anything or anyone’s “plan” to be natural. Plans are made of decisions. Decisions are rational constructs by entities which deem themselves capable of such. Yes, we could program machines to “behave” certain ways. But we are not thereby programming “instincts” when we do that... again, unless we are waxing poetic.
It would be like a jazz musician writing down every note and nuance they are going to play, play it, and insist on still calling it “jazz.” They would have forgotten something essential about jazz… its spontaneity, i.e, contingency...
Resources
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“AI expert: ‘We’ll be toast’ without changes in AI technology,” CNN’s brief interview with Geoffrey Hinton on how “maternal instincts” may need to be engineered into AI.
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“Will AI outsmart human intelligence? - with ‘Godfather of AI’ Geoffrey Hinton,” his talk before The Royal Institute on why he thinks digital intelligence best describes intelligence period, artificial and otherwise, and why AI is on track to outperform us at it. Subjective experience is already manifested in AI. Sentience and consciousness are in the offing. Our goose is cooked as for as intelligence is concerned. Since our significance and identity are so tied up with being the intelligent entities par excellence, we are on the way out. This motivates his rather desperate suggestion to design instincts, like motherliness, into inanimate substrates.
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“Finding God in the App Store | Millions are turning to chatbots for guidance from on high.,” NYT | The Morning, 25 Sep 2025. God discovers AI.
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“Kraftwerk - Metropolis (2009 Remaster) | ALFfx Gems Visual AI Treatment,” keeping robots artificial.
Thanks to Olivia for some of the resources used for this topic.
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- Philm Series: "Birth" (2004) | Jonathan GlazerNeeds location
"– just a little boy in my bath tub."
"A film about belief and conviction and fragile purity of feeling, Birth is nonetheless built on a frank absurdity. – the film can sound sillier the more you try to describe or explain it." – Guy Lodge
Reviews:
- Deep Focus Review – Brian Eggert
- The Guardian – Guy Lodge
I think the entire film can be seen here. If you have trouble seeing it at that link, let me know. I will send you another.
Is this a film about belief in reincarnation or something perhaps equally suspect -- everlasting love? Whichever, it is a beautifully crafted psychological exploration of the need to believe things that transcend the merely sensible.
When it first came out in 2004 it was largely panned by critics as a "bizarre combination of distinguished talent and inane ideas," both "oddly unforgettable" and "hooey" – but now some call it a "magnificent, misunderstood masterpiece." The film stars Nicole Kidman, Lauren Bacall, Danny Huston, and Cameron Bright.
...
On the subject of the hold absurdities can exert on our psychologies, our next topic will address immortality – why many would even consider it were it an option...
- Philm seriesLink visible for attendees
This is not a post for a specific future event but a follow up to suggestions about scheduling film discussions. Here is a list of proposals from me and others. Feel free to add your own suggestions in the comments. The idea is to settle on a film, each of us watch it independently, then come together online to discuss it. The film should be engaging and provocative. Of course, each of us may have different ideas of what that means. And pretty much all great films can be that...
I think another requirement is that it be freely accessible online. The ones listed below, I think, are. (If they are not where you are, let us know. We may find another way to make them accessible.)
You are invited to vote for or give a rating (say, 1 to 10) on any of these films in the comments to help us choose. This could be a regular ongoing series, depending on interest, so it might not be either/or, we may do all of them eventually. (This is not the first time we have had a film discussion. A number of years ago, just before the pandemic, when the club was still meeting in person is Seattle, we did Dogville, Lars von Trier's cinematic provocation.)
The Last Man on Earth (1964) with Vincent Price [interesting in light of the recent pandemic]
Russian Ark [a cinematic tour de force]
Lars von Trier's Dancer in the Dark [Bjork's performance is legendary in this musical tragedy]
Carlos Reygadas' Silent Light [I think this is one of the most powerful and sublime films I have ever seen but I am still looking for a free version with English subtitles]
Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf? [Elizabeth Taylor and Richard Burton show how to do dysfunctional relationships right]
