Conspiracism and demarcation

– or the tendency to believe in a conspiracy as an explanation for some (usually undesirable) social phenomenon. A conspiracy is usually defined as a belief or set of beliefs promulgated by a small group of persons with nefarious motives, but we will take a closer look at the concept.

Sometimes I don’t know where the bullshit ends and the truth begins.
– Joe Gideon in All that Jazz

– the demarcation problem...
– Karl Popper

Though the initial number of promulgators of a conspiracy theory must be small (otherwise, it is a movement and can hardly be secret), the number of believers in the theory may be very large. The promulgators must also intend to convey what is false (for it to remain a “conspiracy” and not an epistemic disagreement), otherwise they are not true conspirators but mistaken believers. However, the believers themselves may be many and sincere in their belief – and even correct in their belief.

Thus,

• the number conspirators must be small relative to the audience they intend to deceive,
• though the number of believers may be very large,
• the conspirators must be aware of the falseness or unlikelihood of their theory,
• while the believers need not be,
• the motivations of the conspirators must be dishonest and not just careless, and
• the most dangerous and effective conspiracies are the products of persons empowered to promulgate

Conspiracies usually dissipate with increased understanding of the states of affairs they purport to describe. They are either replaced by more widely accepted understandings (more or less "truish") or by other conspiracies.

We are going to work toward spelling out criteria for evaluating supposed conspiracy theories. Can a conspiracy theory be true? Yes. Can what it is opposed to, the “official” theory, be a conspiracy, too – or instead? Yes and yes. What are we to believe? How can we tell if a conspiracy is well-founded? In some cases, it is easy. In others, the most philosophically interesting cases, not. We will explore why this is.

This topic falls within the sub branch of philosophy called doxastics, philosophical questions around “belief.” Doxastics is a branch of epistemology, the general study of knowledge, what it is and how it works. It also crosses into ethics, ideas about how we should interact with each other, since knowledge and belief can affect our actions.

Examples of conspiracies can range from the near ludicrous to the quite plausible, from why smoking was once touted a health benefit to Watergate, from Hilary Clinton’s association with a ring of sex-traffickers operating out of a pizza parlor, which some connected with a child slave colony of Mars, to the true cause of and so-called “science” involved in the recent pandemic; from whether Elvis is still alive or who killed Kennedy or who is responsible for 9/11, or to why Jeffery Epstein’s alleged “client list” has not been made public.

A conspiracy can be vast and pervasive – practically global, because there are gradations of awareness. Large numbers of people may be dimly aware that the United States, for example, is a democracy “in name only,” yet still go to the polls “believing” their vote matters. Conspiracies may be local and targeted at certain individuals or small groups. To “gaslight,” as in the classic movie of that name, can focus on making as few as one person feel they are losing their mind.

To the extent one’s own motives are disingenuousness, or we are barely aware of them, or seek to suppress them, it seems one may “conspire” even against oneself. But here we will address conspiracy as a social phenomena. Certain societal background conditions make appeal to conspiracy especially tempting. At the top of the list is loss of trust in social institutions. How does that happen?

Demarcation
Karl Popper, in the early 1960s, famously proposed criteria for sorting science from pseudo-science, theories that do not adhere to received methods that define science. When speculation, untestable hypotheses, and subjective impressions want to sport the label “science,” this is “pseudo-science.” Popper had in mind especially Freudian psychoanalysis and some Marxist theories of history as paradigm cases of pseudo-science. Whatever truthful or useful insights result from these theories, they are not sciences, they border on astrology and homeopathic medicine. Again, a pseudo-science is not necessarily incorrect or a waste of time, it’s just not science. Popper proposed as a test of sciencehood whether a theory could make predictions: if the predictions failed, then the theory that generated them was falsified.

Popper’s theory of falsification was influential and garnered a lot of attention in the philosophy of science, some quite critical. How human knowledge progresses is more complicated than he imagined. Nevertheless, falsificationism remains the gold standard, if there is one, in certain areas of science, allopathic medicine, for example. Randomized controlled trials are touted as the best way to settle the question of the effectiveness of a drug or treatment. If a remedy tested this way is significantly effective, then it has at least not been falsified – yet. It’s important to note that real scientific explanations, hypotheses and theories must always be open to being tested and retested. What passes a test today, may not tomorrow. Revisionism is built into any genuine scientific method. This is because the ideal is reliable information – as close to truth as we may get. And if the stakes are high, as in one’s physical or mental health, the drive to achieve epistemic intimacy with “truth” is urgent.

But the stakes can be high in many other areas of experience such as in collective decisions with major social consequences. What we believe, the explanations we accept, the authorities we recognize, effect decisions, and decisions can effect the quality of lives and even life itself. So if one proposes an explanation for a phenomenon with grave consequences, something we should do something about on pain of suffering them, we need to evaluate the explanation. If there are competing explanations, we need to decide between them. How?

Some explanations are labeled “conspiracies.” Others are labeled “official” or widely accepted. It is usually an epistemic “best practice” to adhere to the “official” or received explanations. These are usually propounded by those qualified to judge in the relevant area of concern. “Conspiracy,” in popular usage, carries with it dismissive connotations. A “conspiracy” can be epistemically defective because not many people believe it, or the ones that do are not qualified to judge it, or they are motivated by non-epistemic, “ulterior” motives, or the believers are willfully ignorant, etc. One more thing: if the promulgators are in positions of communicative power, the stakes are magnified.

Why “usually” and not “always”? Because official theories by recognized authorities are empowered promulgators almost by definition. Unless the principles of the promulgators override every predictable pressure humans are subject to, their theories, too, are compromised – especially and dangerously so by their empowered status.

As with demarcation tests in science, is there a simple method for identifying when an explanation is conspiratorial and when we ought to take it seriously? In the cases that matter most, there isn’t.

Almost all scientifically fruitful explanations we accept now were classed as wrong-headed or conspiratorial when first proposed (and some for a very long time after): the heliocentric theory of why lights in the night sky move the way do, the theory of plate tectonics, proto-theories of what we now call “hormones,” that the earth is not flat, what killed off the dinosaurs, etc… If someone says, “but we know better now, we cannot be fooled again,” they know little of the history of science.

Social “conspiracies” are even more subject to premature dismissal.

There is an ambiguity in the usage of the term “conspiracy.” It may mean:

• The explanation has been rationally evaluated and duly found wanting in support or credibility, or
• we are occupied by other things and feel compelled to rely on the judgment of real or supposed authorities, such as politicians, media, or people presenting as authorities whose qualifications we cannot scrutinize, again, because of our preoccupation. The reality is we must be excused for the preoccupation: we have lives to live and the world is complicated. We must rely on others who are in a better position to know when an explanation is, or is not, a conspiracy.

Excusable or not, the second reason for dismissal is not the same as the first. This is where philosophical analysis parts company with popular views on what counts as a conspiracy. Philosophers are in the business of mulling things over; they are licensed to waste time.

Extended writeup

Resources

• The IEP entry on “Conspiracy Theories” by Marc Pauly is a particularly good and accessible introduction to the philosophical thinking on this subject. Among other considerations, the article brings up the question, when has a “degenerating research program” – that is, a once “official,” now obsolescing, desperate explanation – been mistaken for a conspiracy theory? Efforts to shore up established scientific thinking often share features with conspiracy theories. When does “established” become “sclerotic”? This transition must happen for progress in, or out of, science. In that transition, there is and ought to be ample room for “thinking outside the box.” The big question: how far outside the box?
• “Philosophy and conspiracy theories,” Mr Blakley offers a video survey of the philosophical controversies surrounding conspiracy theories: the trouble with defining conspiracy theory, generalist vs particularist evaluations, the demarcation problem between dismissible and plausible theories and the similarity to that between science and pseudo-science.
• “The Interstellar Object 3I/ATLAS, Avi Loeb and Aliens,” Cool Worlds, hosted by astronomer David Mathew Kipping. Is one of the world’s top scientists, Avi Loeb, trading in conspiracy? This controversy illustrates how close science can get to what many would call “conspiracy,” while still being legitimate science. Genuine scientific thinking must keep an open mind, but, again, how open? Till your brains fall out?
• “Naomi Wolf: ‘Von der Leyen Lied About Pfizer Safety’ – EU Parliament in Shock | APT” Liberal feminist journalist Naomi Wolf speaks before the European Parliament. The occasion for her alarming talk is the book she edited, The Pfizer Papers: Pfizer’s Crimes Against Humanity. She is accused of being a conspiracist for exposing Pfizer’s internal documents on the adverse effects of mRNA vaccines. Is well-documented concern for reproductive health, and health in general – no matter where the political chips fall – a conspiracy?
• Monsanto: “Exposing Why Farmers Can’t Legally Replant Their Own Seeds,” Veritasium. Notice the fingerprints of “conspiracy”: 1. Secrecy, i.e., lack of transparency, 2. Nefarious motives, and 3. Power to inform, or shape communication, i.e., subvert authority (science, academia, regulation, legislation, etc.). What does this do to public trust in institutions? Should we wonder at antivaxxers, et al.? Where does the bullshit end and the truth begin?